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TEXTUALISM AND STATUTORY PRECEDENTS 
Anita S. Krishnakumar 
This Article seeks to shed light on a little-noticed trend in recent U.S. 
Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases: the Court’s textualist 
Justices—or at least some subset of them—have proved remarkably 
willing to abandon stare decisis and to argue in favor of overruling 
established statutory interpretation precedents. This is especially 
curious given that statutory precedents are supposed to be sacrosanct. 
Congress, rather than the Court, is the preferred vehicle for 
correcting any errors in the judicial construction of a statute, and 
courts are to overrule such constructions only in rare, compelling 
circumstances. What, then, accounts for the textualist Justices’ 
unabashed willingness to overrule statutory precedents in recent 
years? And how can this practice be reconciled with textualism’s core 
aims of promoting clarity and stability in the law? 
This Article advances a threefold thesis. First, it argues that the 
textualist Justices view precedents that create a test for implementing 
a statute (e.g., the “motivating factor” test for Title VII violations) as 
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DeGirolami, William N. Eskridge, Margaret H. Lemos, Kate Levine, Michael Perino, 
Rosemary Salomone, Sharmila Sohoni, and Deborah A. Widiss for valuable comments and 
insights on earlier versions of this Article, and to participants at workshops at Yale and 
Cardozo Law Schools for sharpening my thinking about this topic. Special thanks also to 
Dean Michael A. Simons and St. John’s Law School for generous research support.  Finally, 
I am indebted to my husband, Ron Tucker, for his patience with this project and to the 
editors at the Virginia Law Review for excellent editorial work.  All errors are my own.  
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different from ordinary text-parsing statutory interpretation (e.g., 
“labor” means “manual labor”). More specifically, textualist jurists 
regard what I call “implementation test” precedents as akin to 
common-law decision-making, rather than statutory interpretation—
and seem to have created a de facto “implementation-test exception” 
to the heightened stare decisis protection normally afforded statutory 
precedents. Second, the Article links textualist Justices’ proclivity for 
overruling to an oft-unspoken predicate assumption of textualism—
that is, that there is a singular “correct answer” to every question of 
statutory interpretation. This assumption may make it especially 
difficult for textualist jurists to accept the idea that an incorrect 
statutory interpretation should be left in place simply because it was 
first in time. Last, the Article notes that some textualist jurists see 
themselves as “revolutionaries,” whose function is to overthrow the 
old, corrupt jurisprudential order, including outmoded precedents 
reached through the use of illegitimate, atextual interpretive 
resources. 
Ultimately, the Article both supports and critiques textualist Justices’ 
approach to statutory precedents. On the one hand, it argues that a 
relaxed form of stare decisis for implementation test precedents makes 
sense for many reasons, as long as special deference is given to 
implementation tests that Congress has expressly endorsed. At the 
same time, it rejects textualists’ attempts to overrule non-
implementation test precedents based on simple disagreement with the 
original interpretation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statutory stare decisis—sometimes referred to as the “super-strong”1 
presumption that prior judicial interpretations of a statute are correct and 
should not be overruled except by congressional amendment—has been 
the subject of significant normative debate among legal scholars. Some 
have argued that the presumption should be absolute, freezing in place 
judicial interpretations of statutes until and unless Congress acts,2 while 
others have advocated a more relaxed rule that allows for judicial 
overruling of statutory precedents that have grown outmoded.3 Several 
studies—many of them recent—have tackled the related questions of 
how often Congress overrides judicial interpretations of statutes and 
how courts implement such overrides.4 
 
1 I borrow this term from William Eskridge. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling 
Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988). 
2 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an Absolute 
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2467, 2467 (1990); Lawrence C. Marshall, 
“Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. 
Rev. 177, 182–83 (1989) [hereinafter Marshall, Let Congress Do It]; Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 143–45 (2000).  
3 See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1363–64; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the 
Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 Mich. L. 
Rev. 2450, 2452 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, Amorous Defendant].  
4 See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides 
of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317, 
1318 (2014); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331, 334 (1991); Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political 
Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 205, 210 (2013); Virginia 
A. Hettinger & Christopher Zorn, Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional 
Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 Legis. Stud. Q. 5, 6 (2005); Pablo T. Spiller & 
Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court 
Decisions, 16 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 503, 504 (1996); Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow 
Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional 
Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 511, 516–17 (2009) [hereinafter Widiss, Shadow 
Precedents]; Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra 
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Largely absent from the literature, however, has been any discussion 
of the relationship between statutory interpretation theory and statutory 
stare decisis.5 That is, do textualist and purposivist interpretive 
philosophies differ in their theoretical views toward statutory stare 
decisis? Are there any noticeable differences in how jurists who 
associate themselves with different interpretive theories treat or talk 
about statutory stare decisis? For all the attention that scholars have 
devoted to methodological differences in statutory interpretation, no one 
seems to have given much thought to differences in interpretive views 
about statutory stare decisis. Meanwhile, scholarship in this area is 
increasingly relevant because several recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions reveal a surprising trend: the Court’s textualists—or at least 
some subset of them—regularly are willing to overturn statutory 
precedents. Indeed, they are far more willing to do so than are their 
purposivist counterparts. This trend is noteworthy because it is the 
opposite of what we would expect; on the whole, textualists tend to 
prioritize the predictability and stability of legal rules and other “rule of 
law” values over the flexibility associated with looser, case-by-case 
decision-making.6 Purposivists, by contrast, tend to be more willing to 
tolerate inconsistency and case-by-case adjudication. Yet, during the 
Roberts Court’s first decade, the Court’s textualist or textualist-leaning 
Justices repeatedly have called for overruling a statutory precedent, even 
when doing so would upset settled expectations.7 By contrast, the 
Court’s purposivist Justices have called for overruling a statutory 
precedent only once during the same period.8 
 
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 859, 865 (2012) [hereinafter Widiss, 
Undermining Overrides].  
5 But see Stephen M. Rich, A Matter of Perspective: Textualism, Stare Decisis, and 
Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1197, 1202 (2014) (arguing 
that textualist interpretive methodology has undermined several employment-law doctrines 
without expressly overruling them, stare decisis notwithstanding).  
6 See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, The Ages Of American Law 17 (1977) (maintaining that 
formalism “holds out the promise of stability, certainty, and predictability”); Antonin Scalia 
& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts xxix (2012) 
(“[T]extualism will provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and 
greater respect for the rule of law.”); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 
597–98 (1987) (noting that predictability is important in planning and litigation).  
7 See infra Appendix I (listing twelve such cases in ten terms). 
8 See id. 
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Consider a few examples. In 2015, self-avowed textualist Justices 
Alito, Thomas, and Roberts voted (in dissent) to overrule a 1964 Patent 
Act precedent because the Court’s original interpretation was based on 
an economic theory that has since been “debunked.”9 A few terms 
earlier, Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia similarly argued (in a 
concurrence) that a 1988 securities law precedent should be overruled 
because it was based on a since-disproved theory of efficient markets.10 
In a handful of other cases, Justice Thomas has issued solo dissents 
arguing that a statutory precedent should be overruled, stare decisis 
notwithstanding.11 While judges and commentators have articulated a 
few exceptions to statutory stare decisis that the entire Court follows, the 
textualist Justices’ calls to overrule in the above cases have not tended to 
fit into such exceptions.12 Only one of the above cases, for example, 
involved a so-called “common-law statute”—that is, a statute that is 
considered a delegation of broad authority to courts and therefore 
exempt from statutory stare decisis.13 
The puzzle thus emerges: what accounts for textualist Justices’ 
dismissiveness towards statutory precedents in such cases? One obvious 
 
9 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
10 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417–27 (2014) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgement).  
11 See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114–16 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a 
nonexhaustive list of Roberts and Rehnquist Court cases in which at least one Justice called 
for overruling a statutory precedent, see infra Appendix I.  
12 See discussion infra Part I. Previously articulated exceptions include those for (1) 
procedural flaws—for example, when a precedent was the product of poor briefing or 
inadequate deliberation by the Court; (2) common-law or constitutionalized statutes; and (3) 
instances where Congress or private persons relied upon the precedent. See Eskridge, supra 
note 1, at 1369–84.  
13 The case was Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007). 
Four other cases listed in Appendix I also involved the Sherman Act. For detailed discussion 
of the common-law-statutes exception to statutory stare decisis, see, for example, Ethan J. 
Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 Yale L.J. 
Online 47, 53 (2010) (“In the world of what are sometimes known as common law statutes, 
broad delegation to the judiciary is uncontroversial, and the legislature expects judges to 
develop the law over time by utilizing a free-form common law method.”); Margaret H. 
Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are “Common-Law Statutes” 
Different?, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law 89, 91–93 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013).  
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answer is ideology—that is, that textualist Justices are less respectful of 
statutory precedents that produce results that run counter to their 
ideological preferences. But while ideology certainly seems to play some 
role in some of the cases, it does not provide a complete explanation for 
the Justices’ approaches in all the cases that advocate overruling a 
statutory precedent.14 And although some of the cases may be explained 
as simple instances of textualist jurists prioritizing a clear text over a 
precedent they believe misreads that text, most cannot. In fact, many of 
the cases in which textualist or textualist-leaning Justices have voted to 
reject an established statutory precedent have not involved much textual 
analysis at all.15 So something other than ideology and fidelity to text 
must be at work in at least some of the cases. 
This Article seeks to bring critical attention to textualist jurists’ 
demonstrated willingness to flout the doctrine of statutory stare 
decisis—and to use this surprising trend as a lens through which to glean 
important insights about statutory interpretation theory and textualism in 
particular. Most statutory interpretation scholarship is top-down. It 
conceives of theories of statutory interpretation in a highly abstract and 
idealized fashion, debating the merits of textualism, purposivism, and 
pragmatism in general terms and using particular cases merely as one-
off illustrations or to score debating points.16 In the statutory stare 
 
14 See discussion infra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.  
15 See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); 
Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2418 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement); Michigan v. Bay 
Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that 
although he initially joined in the interpretation at issue, time has proved that decision wrong 
and “[r]ather than insist that Congress clean up a mess that [he] helped make, [he] would 
overrule [the precedent]”); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that precedent interpretation 
that extended tribal sovereign immunity to suits arising out of an Indian tribe’s commercial 
activities outside its territory was unsupported by the underlying rationale for tribal 
immunity, inconsistent with limits on tribal sovereignty, and interfered with state 
sovereignty and that the passage of time has proved it a bad interpretation); Leegin, 551 U.S. 
at 882; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (overruling precedent based on 
subsequent developments in legal doctrine and evolving economic theories about vertical 
price restraints); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1991) (O’Connor 
& Scalia, JJ., dissenting). 
16 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1479-81 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory 
Interpretation, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671 (1999); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists 
From Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 70 (2006); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 
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decisis context, this conventional, theory-driven approach has caused 
scholars to miss the fact that textualist and purposivist Justices have 
starkly different views about several issues that make a great deal of 
practical difference in how courts interpret statutes. For example, 
textualists and purposivists diverge in their views about the “stickiness” 
of precedents that establish tests for implementing a statute, about the 
role of the U.S. Supreme Court in supervising how such implementation 
tests fare in the lower courts, and about how judges should treat 
legislative overrides of the Court’s interpretations.17 
This Article deviates from the conventional top-down approach. 
Instead, it begins from the bottom-up, examining patterns in cases 
involving statutory stare decisis to discover what they reveal about 
statutory interpretation theory. The Article proceeds in three Parts.  
 
 Part I catalogues several recent cases in which textualist or textualist-
leaning Justices18 have voted to overrule an established statutory 
 
91 Va. L. Rev. 347 (2005); Vermeule, supra note 2. Thanks to Mila Sohoni for pointing this 
out.  
17 See discussion infra Parts II.A & II.B. 
18 For purposes of this Article, I count as “textualists” Justices Scalia and Thomas and as 
“textualist-leaning” Justices Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy. Justices Scalia and Thomas 
regularly identify themselves as textualists and clearly follow a textualist interpretive 
methodology—seeking to identify the plain meaning of statutory text, informed by 
dictionary definitions, language canons, and the whole-act rule while eschewing reliance on 
legislative history, intent, and purpose. Justices Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy, although less 
purist in their use of textualist interpretive tools, also emphasize these tools when construing 
statutes. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
825, 849 (2017); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1883, 1887 
(2008) (“[I]t appears that several Justices—clearly Justices Scalia and Thomas, and perhaps 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy—on the Supreme Court now consider 
themselves textualists.”). This labeling is consistent with how other scholars and 
commentators have depicted these Justices. See Ernest Gellhorn, Justice Breyer on Statutory 
Review and Interpretation, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 755, 758 (1995) (“Justices Kennedy and 
Scalia have led a ‘textualist’ movement claiming that the ‘plain meaning’ of the statute 
should be given effect.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 125 & n.505 (2001) (calling Justice Kennedy a textualist “fellow 
traveler[]”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist, 
8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 747, 748 n.5 (1995) (listing Justice Kennedy as a textualist); John F. 
Duffy, In re Nuitjen: Patentable Subject Matter, Textualism and the Supreme Court, 
Patently-O (Feb. 5, 2007), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2007/02/in_re_nuijten_p.html 
(observing that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito 
“adhere to some form of fairly rigorous textualism in statutory interpretation”). I have not 
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precedent.  Part II advances three theories and lessons about textualism 
that emerge from close examination of textualist Justices’ willingness to 
depart from statutory stare decisis in those cases. First, textualist Justices 
are especially willing to overturn statutory precedents that establish a 
decision-making rule designed to guide the implementation of the statute 
in future cases, as opposed to precedents that closely parse the meaning 
of statutory text. For example, they consider a precedent that establishes 
a burden-shifting test for Title VII lawsuits as less authoritative than a 
precedent that construes the word “labor” to refer only to “manual” but 
not “intellectual” labor. The explanation for this appears to be that 
textualist Justices view precedents that articulate an implementation test 
as more akin to judge-made common law rules than traditional statutory 
construction. Accordingly, they consider it the Court’s, rather than 
Congress’s, responsibility to correct errors in such tests. Second, Part II 
argues that textualist Justices, particularly in the post-Scalia era,19 seem 
prone to a “correct answer” mindset—and that this jurisprudential 
commitment to precision and a single correct statutory meaning may 
make it particularly difficult for textualist Justices to sacrifice accuracy 
in favor of stability. In addition, and perhaps relatedly, some textualist 
jurists see themselves as revolutionaries, whose purpose and function is 
to overthrow the old, corrupt judicial order, including improperly 
reasoned statutory precedents. 
 
counted Justice Gorsuch as a “textualist” or “textualist-leaning” Justice because as this 
article goes to press, he has been on the U.S. Supreme Court for only a few months and has 
participated in only a few cases. While one commentator has labeled Justice Gorsuch a 
“textualist,” see Ramesh Ponnuru, Neil Gorsuch: A Worthy Heir to Scalia, Nat’l Rev. (Jan. 
31, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/444437/neil-gorsuch-antonin-scalias-
textualist-originalist-heir), scholars have not yet studied his opinions or approach in statutory 
cases systematically. Without the benefit of such systematic analysis, it would be premature 
to characterize him as either “textualist” or “textualist-leaning,” and it would be especially 
premature to opine about his approach to statutory stare decisis. 
19 Justice Scalia is widely considered to have ushered in a radical new form of statutory 
interpretation in the 1990s—the “New Textualism,” which broke from the old, soft plain-
meaning rule and traditional textualism in its absolutist rejection of all forms of legislative 
history and its emphasis on ordinary usage and consistency with the “corpus juris” (the 
surrounding body of law) as the lodestars of statutory interpretation. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621, 623–24 (1990); Antonin 
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal 
Courts and the Law 3, 17 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997). 
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Part III considers the normative implications of the theories advanced 
in Part II. It argues that while certain elements of textualists’ approach to 
statutory precedents may properly be retained, others deserve to be 
jettisoned. When courts create tests for implementing a statute, they are 
engaging in a gap-filling enterprise similar to that which administrative 
agencies perform and courts, like agencies, should have the power to 
update or revise these tests to reflect practical difficulties experienced in 
administering them. But this principle is subject to an important limit: 
relaxed stare decisis for statutory precedents is appropriate only in the 
limited context of precedents that establish an implementation test and 
does not justify overruling precedents with which later courts simply 
disagree. 
I. RECENT TEXTUALIST DEPARTURES FROM STATUTORY STARE DECISIS 
Before delving into the cases, it is worth providing a little 
background. Statutory precedents are supposed to enjoy a special status 
in the law. Whereas common-law precedents are entitled to an ordinary 
“presumption of correctness” and constitutional precedents receive a 
relaxed presumption of correctness—because the complexity of 
amending the Constitution makes judicial correction the only effective 
avenue for fixing errors in constitutional interpretation—statutory 
precedents are treated to a “super-strong” presumption of correctness.20 
Indeed, the Court has said that it will overrule statutory precedents only 
under the most compelling circumstances, and Justice Brandeis 
famously commented that “in most matters it is more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is 
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, 
provided correction can be had by legislation.”21 Numerous judges and 
commentators have noted that the Court’s heightened fidelity to stare 
decisis in the statutory context “marks an essential difference between 
 
20  Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1362; see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 
406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
21 Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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statutory interpretation on the one hand and [common] law and 
constitutional interpretation on the other.”22  
Scholars have both applauded and criticized this heightened 
presumption of correctness. Professor Frank Horack, for example, 
argued that the presumption is a necessary corollary to the separation of 
powers. He reasoned that once the Court has interpreted a statute, the 
statute becomes “amended to the extent of the Court’s decision” so that 
“[a]fter the decision, whether the Court correctly or incorrectly 
interpreted the statute, the law consists of the statute plus the decision of 
the Court.”23  If the Court later reverses the position it took in the first 
case, it is “affirmatively changing an established rule of law under which 
society has been operating”—something that is “explicitly and 
unquestionably the exercise of a legislative function.”24  
Professor Lawrence Marshall has advocated going one step further, 
urging the Court to adopt an absolute rule of stare decisis for all its 
statutory decisions.25 Marshall reasons that as an elected branch, 
Congress, rather than the Court, must be an “active participant in the 
ongoing process of statutory lawmaking” and that the only way to 
ensure that this will happen is to “let Congress know that it, and only it, 
is responsible for reviewing the Court’s statutory decisions, and that it, 
and only it, has the power to overrule the Court’s interpretations of 
 
22 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S 409, 424 n.34 (1986) (quoting 
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 540 (1948)). 
See also Frank E. Horack, Jr., Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 Tex. 
L. Rev. 247, 248–49 (1947) (defending the super-strong presumption against overruling 
statutory precedents); Robert E. Keeton, Venturing to Do Justice: Reforming Private Law 
79–80 (1969) (citing Levi’s arguments in favor of stricter stare decisis because controversial 
changes are better enacted by the legislature); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. 
L. Rev. 367, 388–89 (1988) (criticizing the Court’s disparate treatment of statutory versus 
common law or constitutional precedents); C. Paul Rogers III, Judicial Reinterpretation of 
Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Houston L. Rev. 611, 611, 626 
(1977) (noting that the “prevailing view” is that stare decisis should be followed more 
strictly for statutory precedents than for “common law or [other] court-made precedents”); 
James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, 
the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 345, 370 (1986) (defending the 
presumption in statutory but not constitutional cases). 
23 Horack, supra note 22, at 250–51 (emphasis in original). 
24 Id. at 251. 
25 See Marshall, Let Congress Do It, supra note 2, at 183. 
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federal statutes.”26 Professor Adrian Vermeule has seconded the call for 
an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, based on traditional textualist 
concerns about administrative efficiency.27 
By contrast, Professor Bill Eskridge and other pragmatist legal 
process scholars have urged judges to take a more relaxed approach to 
statutory stare decisis—one that allows for overruling precedents that 
have grown outmoded over time.28 For example, Eskridge argues that 
the heightened presumption in favor of upholding statutory precedents 
should give way when changed circumstances render a precedent 
inconsistent with original legislative expectations or evolving statutory 
policy, or when practical experience suggests that a precedent is no 
longer working.29 
In regularly calling for overruling statutory precedents, the textualist 
and textualist-leaning Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have thus 
taken an approach that—oddly—is more in line with the one advocated 
by their philosophical adversary, Bill Eskridge, than by their intellectual 
ally Adrian Vermeule. Again, this is the opposite of what we would 
expect based on theory alone, as textualism prioritizes predictability and 
stability in the law.30 
This Part examines several cases in which textualist or textualist-
leaning Justices on the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts voted to overrule a 
statutory precedent. Section A discusses cases in which textualist 
Justices advocated rejecting a statutory precedent because the precedent 
was based on a since-discredited economic theory. Section B examines 
cases in which textualist Justices refused to apply a precedent 
interpreting one statute to a closely related statute that was modeled on 
or contained the exact same language as the statute interpreted in the 
precedent case. Section C explores cases in which textualist Justices 
 
26 Id.  
27 See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 143–45 (“The stronger the rule of statutory stare decisis, 
the less frequently litigants will request an overruling and the less time that must be spent on 
reconsidering previously decided questions.”). 
28 See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 317, 342–47 (2005); Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of 
Statutes 252–55 (1975); Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1363; Eskridge, Amorous Defendant, 
supra note 3, at 2452.  
29 See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1364. 
30 See sources cited supra note 6. 
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advocated overruling a statutory precedent on the grounds that it had 
proved unworkable. 
A. Evolving Economic Theory Cases 
Appendix I provides a list of Supreme Court cases decided between 
1970 and 2015 in which a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion 
advocated overturning a statutory precedent.31 This list of cases is 
nonexhaustive, although particular attention was paid to identifying 
cases decided during the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts (from 1986 to 
2015). The Justices who joined in the opinion that advocated overruling 
and the reason(s) they provided to justify overruling are listed in the last 
two columns.32 As the Appendix shows, in several cases, the Court’s 
textualist or textualist-leaning Justices advocated overruling on the 
ground that the Court’s initial interpretation was based on an economic 
theory that had since been “soundly refuted.”33 Although textualist 
Justices succeeded in overruling the precedent in only one of these 
cases, their opinions, when taken together, sound a consistent theme that 
statutory interpretations based on outdated economic theories should 
constitute an exception to the rule of statutory stare decisis. 
Consider, for example, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Kimble v. 
Marvel Entertainment.34 Kimble involved a provision of the Patent Act, 
which grants certain exclusive rights to a patentee and “his heirs or 
assigns” and provides that a patent expires twenty years from its 
 
31 See infra Appendix I. 
32 See id. 
33 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). See also 
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgement) (urging the Court to overrule a precedent because “[l]ogic, economic 
realities, and our subsequent jurisprudence have undermined [its] foundations”); Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007) (justifying Court’s decision 
to overrule precedent making resale price maintenance per se illegal in part on grounds that 
the “economics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer’s 
use of resale price maintenance”); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–
48 (1977) (overruling precedent in part because it had “been the subject of continuing 
controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals and in the federal courts,” and went 
against “[t]he great weight of scholarly opinion”). 
34 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415.  
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application date.35  A 1964 precedent, Brulotte v. Thys Co., held that a 
patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his invention after its 
patent term has expired.36 Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider-Man-
inspired web-slinging toy.37 Marvel later marketed a similar toy, Kimble 
sued for patent infringement, and the parties entered a settlement 
agreement through which Marvel purchased Kimble’s patent and agreed 
to pay Kimble a royalty.38 Some years later, Marvel stumbled upon the 
Brulotte decision and sought a declaratory judgment establishing that 
Brulotte effectively sunsets the royalty clause in its settlement 
agreement with Kimble.39 Kimble countered that Brulotte should be 
overruled because it (1) is based on an economic theory—that post-
patent-expiration royalties constitute an anti-competitive tying 
arrangement—that has since been severely criticized; and (2) creates 
several anticompetitive effects of its own.40 Kimble cited numerous law 
review articles and treatises41 as well as three Court of Appeals 
decisions42 to demonstrate that the Brulotte rule is widely considered 
outdated, misguided, and anticompetitive in effect. 
A majority of the Court acknowledged that a “broad scholarly 
consensus” supported Kimble’s criticism of the Brulotte rule,43 but 
nevertheless upheld the rule based almost entirely on statutory stare 
decisis.44 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Alito, joined by Justices 
 
35 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), (2) (2012). 
36 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964). 
37 See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405. 
38 Id. at 2406.  
39 See id.  
40 See id. at 2412–14. 
41 See Brief for Petitioners at ix-xii, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 
13-720), 2015 WL 428993.  
42 See id. at 15–16 (citing Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 
2013) (“Brulotte rule is counterintuitive and its rationale is arguably unconvincing”); Zila, 
Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1019 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that Brulotte is 
“economically unconvincing” and has been “criticized roundly”); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., 
293 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (observing that 
Brulotte “incorrectly assumes that a patent license has significance after the patent 
terminates” and has been “justly[] criticized”).  
43 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412. 
44 Id. at 2412–13. The majority also stressed that Brulotte did not “hinge” on the economic 
argument that Kimble criticized. See id. at 2413.  
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Thomas and Roberts, argued that the Court should have overruled 
Brulotte.45 The dissenters’ chief arguments were that (1) the Brulotte 
rule was a judicial rule, arrived at through application of an economic 
theory, rather than a strict interpretation of the language of the Patent 
Act; and (2) the economic theory on which Brulotte was based had been 
“soundly refuted” in the fifty years since Brulotte was decided.46 
A second economic-theory case in which the textualist Justices 
ignored statutory stare decisis also bears mentioning: Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.47 Leegin involved a ninety-five-
year-old statutory precedent, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & 
Sons Co., in which the Court had ruled that it is per se illegal under the 
Sherman Act for a manufacturer to set a minimum price that distributors 
must charge for the manufacturer’s goods.48 Unlike in Kimble, the 
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices prevailed in Leegin. As in 
Kimble, the textualists’ chief reason for abandoning the Dr. Miles 
precedent was a supposedly widespread consensus in the economics 
literature that resale price maintenance does not necessarily produce 
anticompetitive effects and can even have procompetitive effects.49 The 
majority opinion recited arguments from numerous treatises, books, and 
articles—going on for three full pages—to support its conclusion that it 
no longer made sense to follow Dr. Miles’s per se rule.50 It also argued 
 
45 See id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting). Notably, Justices Thomas and Alito voted to 
overrule the statutory precedent in all three of the economic theory cases discussed in this 
Section. See id.; Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 
551 U.S. 877, 880 (2007). Justices Scalia and Roberts voted to overrule in two of the three 
cases, and Justice Kennedy voted to do so in one case. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 
(Roberts); Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2417 (Scalia), Leegin, 551 U.S. at 880 (Roberts, Scalia, 
and Kennedy). 
46 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
47 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
48 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).  
49 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889–92. 
50 See id. (citing, e.g., Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 288–91 (1978); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 184–191 (2005); Bureau of 
Economics Staff Report to the FTC, T. Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic 
Theories and Empirical Evidence 170 (1983); Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price 
Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34 J. Law & Econ. 263, 292–93 (1991); 
Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement 
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that the Dr. Miles rule was inconsistent with other, more recent Supreme 
Court decisions.51 The dissenting Justices, mostly purposivists, disputed 
the economic-consensus argument, insisting that there was nothing new 
in the studies the majority invoked, that the economics literature also 
contained arguments supporting the Dr. Miles rule, and that several 
congressional actions, including the repeal of a related statute, showed 
legislative approval of the Dr. Miles rule.52 
Importantly, Leegin involved the Sherman Act, long considered a 
“common-law statute” that is supposed to evolve to meet the dynamics 
of current economic conditions. Common-law statutes are said to be 
phrased in “sweeping, general” language that is meant to confer a broad 
delegation of authority to courts to “develop[] legal rules on a case-by-
case basis in the common-law tradition.”53 In other words, judges are 
supposed to update the Sherman Act to reflect developments in antitrust 
law.54  Some commentators have suggested that securities and 
intellectual property statutes also should be treated like common law 
statutes,55 and the plaintiff (and dissent) in Kimble sought to analogize 
the Patent Act to antitrust statutes.56 
In one sense, then, the textualist Justices’ eagerness to overrule 
precedents based on misguided economic theories could be chalked up 
to an exercise of the traditional common-law statutes exception to 
 
Mechanisms, 31 J. Law & Econ. 265, 295 (1988); Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The 
Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance, 13 Rev. Indus. Org. 57, 74–75 (1998)).  
51 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 901–02. 
52 See id. at 908–12, 919 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
53 Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
54 See, e.g., Leegin, 511 U.S. at 899–900.  
55 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 1126, 
1167 (2009) (calling the Copyright Act a “common law statute”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1052 (1989) (calling anti-
fraud provisions of securities laws “common law statutes”); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: 
Champion of Free Speech, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 187, 198–99 (2004) (describing the 
Lanham Act and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act as “delegating” statutes); Craig Allen 
Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U.L. Rev. 51, 53 (2010) (calling 
the Patent Act a “common law enabling statute”).  
56See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Brulotte was an antitrust decision 
masquerading as a patent case.”); Brief for Petitioners, at 11, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 
135 S.Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720), 2015 WL 428993. 
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statutory stare decisis. But such a characterization misses something 
important: these cases demonstrate a significant, and somewhat 
controversial, progression from the traditional common-law statutes 
exception. The exception is supposed to apply when the law in the 
relevant field—e.g., antitrust, securities, intellectual property—has 
changed, not when new academic papers are published questioning or 
criticizing the theory the Court has adopted when giving meaning to 
broad language in a statutory provision. Yet the textualist Justices seem 
to be following a tacit rule that statutory precedents that are based on 
economic theories can and should be updated or overruled if the relevant 
economic theory—rather than the law in the relevant field—later 
evolves. That is, they seem to be recognizing an “incorrect economic 
theory” exception to statutory stare decisis. Sections II.A and II.C.1 will 
expand on this concept, arguing that textualists’ willingness to update 
statutory precedents they believe to be based on outmoded economic 
theories is connected to two larger jurisprudential principles: (1) a belief 
that statutory precedents that establish a judicial test for implementing a 
statutory provision are less binding than those that establish the meaning 
of statutory text; and (2) a commitment to finding the one “correct” 
statutory reading. 
B. Not Quite Stare Decisis: Statutes In Pari Materia 
The Court’s textualist Justices also have proved willing to reject 
statutory stare decisis in cases involving the application of a precedent 
that construes a closely related statute, even when the two statutes 
contain identical language and the second statute derived its language in 
haec verba from the statute at issue in the initial case.57 The in pari 
materia rule directs courts to interpret closely related statutes that 
contain the same language or deal with the same subject matter 
similarly.58 Thus, if an armed robbery statute has been interpreted to 
 
57 “In haec verba” is a Latin phrase that means “in the same words.” In haec verba, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).  
58 See, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citations omitted) (explaining that statutes addressing the same subject 
matter are in pari materia and should be construed “as if they were one law.”); United States 
v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (citations omitted) (same).  
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mean “X,” then similar or identical language in a carjacking statute 
modeled on that armed robbery statute should be read to mean “X” as 
well. In other words, a precedent interpreting statute A is to be applied 
to similar or identical language in statute B as well. The Court’s 
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices have ignored, or have advocated 
ignoring, this rule as well. 
Consider, for example, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,59 which 
construed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(“ADEA”).60 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to take 
adverse action against an employee “because of such individual’s age.”61 
In an earlier case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,62 the Court63 had 
announced a burden-shifting rule for determining when an employer has 
taken unlawful adverse action against an employee under identical 
language in Title VII prohibiting discrimination “because of such 
individual’s . . . sex.”64 Under that test, a plaintiff was required to show 
by “direct evidence” that sex “was a substantial factor” in the 
employer’s decision. This showing then shifted the burden to the 
employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the same adverse 
action even absent reliance on the prohibited criteria.65 
In Gross, the Court, in a majority opinion authored by arch-textualist 
Justice Thomas and joined by the same Justices who overruled the Dr. 
Miles precedent in Leegin, voted to overrule Price Waterhouse as 
applied to the ADEA.66 The opinion justified this departure from 
statutory stare decisis on two grounds. First, it noted that after Price 
Waterhouse was decided, Congress amended Title VII to explicitly 
endorse the “substantial factor” concept, without similarly amending the 
 
59 557 U.S. 167, 169–70 (2009).  
60 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012)).  
61 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012). 
62 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
63 The test was announced in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion. Because no opinion 
garnered five votes, O’Connor’s opinion was considered controlling by most lower courts. 
Justice White also concurred, but Justice O’Connor’s opinion was believed to present the 
narrowest holding supporting the outcome. See Widiss, Undermining Overrides, supra note 
4, at 884.  
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a)(1), (2) (2012). 
65 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgement). 
66 Gross, 557 U.S. at 167, 170–74 (2009). 
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ADEA.67 Second, it argued that, “Title VII is materially different [from 
the ADEA] with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion.”68 As 
commentators have noted, this was a stunning argument, given well-
established Supreme Court precedent holding that the substantive 
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA are to be interpreted identically 
because the ADEA was derived “in haec verba” from Title VII.69 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s Price Waterhouse dissent had assumed that 
the plurality’s mixed-motives framework extended to the ADEA,70 and 
all the Courts of Appeals that considered the issue before Gross had 
unanimously applied Price Waterhouse to ADEA claims.71 Even 
respondent’s brief acknowledged the unorthodoxy of treating Title VII 
and the ADEA differently, asking the Court to “overrule Price 
Waterhouse with respect to its application to the ADEA.”72 Justice 
Thomas’s Gross opinion also noted that Price Waterhouse’s burden-
shifting framework was difficult for lower courts to apply and stated that 
it would be unwise to extend that framework to ADEA claims.73 
 
67 See id. at 173–74. 
68 Id. at 173. 
69 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (quoting Lorillard 
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)). See generally Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis , 412 
U.S. 427, 428, (1973) (per curiam) (interpreting the Emergency School Aid Act in light of 
the Civil Rights Act as the relevant provisions shared similar language and a “common 
raison d’être”). See also Widiss, Undermining Overrides, supra note 4, at 890–92 (“The 
majority opinion relegates to a footnote the starting premise . . . that the substantive 
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA are generally interpreted identically.”).  
70 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
71 See Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2000); Ostrowski v. 
Atlantic Mut. Ins., 968 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1992); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
54 F.3d 1089, 1093, 1095 (3d Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Warfield–Rohr Casket Co., 364 F.3d 
160, 164 (4th Cir. 2004); Rachid v. Jack In The Box, 376 F.3d 305, 309–12 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570-71 (6th Cir. 2003); Visser v. 
Packer Eng. Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Hutson v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 1995); Gonzagowski v. Widnall, 115 F.3d 744, 
749 (10th Cir. 1997); Lewis v. YMCA, 208 F.3d 1303, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2000) (per 
curiam).  
72 Brief for Respondent at 26–40, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (No. 
08-441), 2009 WL 507026.  
73 Gross, 557 U.S. at 179. In 1991, after Price Waterhouse and well before Gross was 
decided, Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act, a major statute that sought to override 
several highly unpopular Supreme Court Title VII decisions, including Price Waterhouse. 
The 1991 CRA replaced Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting test with an outright ban on 
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In a similar vein was CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, which 
involved Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.74 Section 1981 
provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”75 The statutory 
question in CBOCS was whether Section 1981 encompasses a claim that 
an employer has retaliated against an employee for complaining that the 
employer violated another person’s Section 1981 rights. In an earlier 
case, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, the Court had construed a related 
provision of the Civil Rights Act, Section 1982, to encompass a claim 
by a white landowner who alleged retaliation by a homeowners’ 
association after the landowner protested the association’s 
discrimination against the landowner’s black tenant.76 Later cases made 
clear that Sullivan stands for the proposition that Section 1982 
encompasses retaliation claims.77 
The language of Section 1982 is identical to the language of Section 
1981, except that Section 1982 guarantees the right “to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,” rather than the 
right to “make and enforce contracts.”78 As with Title VII and the 
ADEA, the Court has long construed Sections 1981 and 1982 similarly, 
in recognition of these “sister statutes’ common language, origin, and 
purposes.”79 
 
using sex or any other prohibited criteria as a “motivating factor” in an employment 
decision, as well as limited the effect of an employer’s showing that it would have made the 
same decision. The 1991 congressional override is discussed further in Section III.A. What is 
important to note here is that the Gross majority opinion did not directly address the 1991 
CRA—except to point out that Congress amended only Title VII to allow “mixed motive 
claims”—and did not similarly amend the ADEA. Id. at 174. 
74 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008). 
75 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012). 
76 396 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1969).  
77 See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005) (“[I]n Sullivan 
we interpreted a general prohibition on racial discrimination [in § 1982] to cover retaliation 
against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition.”).  
78 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1981(a) (2012). 
79 See CBOCS, 553 U.S. at 448. Specifically, the Court noted that both § 1981 and § 1982 
trace their origins to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-26, § 1, 14 Stat. 27; that 
both provisions “represent[] an immediately post-Civil War legislative effort to guarantee 
the then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy”; and that both 
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In 1989, twenty years after Sullivan, the Court in Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union80 significantly limited the scope of Section 1981, finding 
that the phrase “to make and enforce contracts” does not apply to 
“conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been 
established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition 
of discriminatory working conditions.”81 Because victims of an 
employer’s retaliation often will have opposed discriminatory conduct 
that took place after the formation of the employment contract, 
Patterson’s holding seemed in practice to foreclose retaliation claims. 
However, in 1991, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
(“CRA”), which overruled Patterson.82 
The Court thus faced the question whether Congress’s overruling of 
Patterson reinstated the pre-Patterson consensus rule that Sullivan’s 
retaliation holding applied to Section 1981 as well as Section 1982. A 
majority of the Court ruled that the 1991 CRA amendments did have this 
effect, and that: 
Sullivan, as interpreted and relied upon by Jackson, as well as the long 
line of related cases where we construe Sections 1981 and 1982 
similarly, lead us to conclude that the view that Section 1981 
encompasses retaliation claims is indeed well embedded in the law. 
That being so, considerations of stare decisis strongly support our 
adherence to that view.83 
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, arguing that “the Court’s 
holding has no basis in the text of Section 1981.”84  The dissent did not 
attack the original Sullivan decision, but maintained that later cases 
 
provisions use “broad language” providing that all citizens or persons within the United 
States shall enjoy the same rights enjoyed by white citizens. See id. at 448 (citing Gen. Bldg. 
Contractors Ass’n. v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 383–84, 388 (1982); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431, 439–40, (1973); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409, 441 n.78, (1968)) (noting “shared historical roots” and “strong purposive connection 
between the two provisions”).  
80 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
81 Id. at 171, 177. 
82 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981). 
83 CBOCS, 553 U.S. at 451. 
84 Id. at 457–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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holding that Section 1982 encompasses retaliation claims misread 
Sullivan and ignored the statutory text.85 The most striking thing about 
Justice Thomas’s dissent, however, was its bald insistence that even if 
Sullivan had “squarely and unambiguously held that Section 1982 
provides an implied cause of action for retaliation,” the Court should not 
extend Sullivan’s erroneous interpretation of Section 1982 to Section 
1981:86 
[E]rroneous precedents need not be extended to their logical end, even 
when dealing with related provisions that normally would be 
interpreted in lockstep. Otherwise, stare decisis, designed to be a 
principle of stability and repose, would become a vehicle of change 
whereby an error in one area metastasizes into others, thereby 
distorting the law.87  
In other words, in CBOCS, as in Gross, Justices Thomas and Scalia 
argued that statutory precedents should not apply to related provisions in 
other statutes when the Court believes that the precedent interpretation is 
erroneous or has had undesirable consequences.88 The normative 
desirability of such an approach is discussed infra Part III.B. Here, I 
simply note that this argument illustrates Justice Thomas’s strong 
emphasis on adopting the “correct reading” of the statute and his 
unwillingness to put stare decisis ahead of accuracy. Justice Thomas’s 
lack of tolerance for “incorrect” statutory constructions is further on 
display in several solo dissents in which he alone voted to overrule.89 
The cases range in subject area and statute type but demonstrate a shared 
resistance to following statutory stare decisis for its own sake. 
The borrowed-statute precedent cases discussed in this Section are, of 
course, different from the “evolving economic theory” cases in that they 
 
85 Id. at 464–69. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 468–70. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 469–70. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
88 In a similar vein is Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2526–31 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that erroneous precedents interpreting Title VII and ADEA should not be applied in 
interpreting the Fair Housing Act). 
89 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 260–61 (2008) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kimbrough 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114–16 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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involve the application of a statutory precedent to a different statute than 
the one at issue in the initial case. However, given the longstanding 
judicial practice of applying precedents involving Title VII and the 
ADEA and Section 1981 and 1982 interchangeably, these cases raise the 
same puzzle as the economic-theory cases discussed in the previous 
Section: why are the textualist and textualist-leaning Justices willing to 
abandon statutory stare decisis for certain statutes in certain cases? 
C. “Unworkable” Precedents 
Modern textualists also have argued—usually unsuccessfully—that a 
statute should be overruled because it has proved “unworkable” or 
“confusing” to implement. “Unworkability” is a long-standing, 
traditional ground for abandoning a precedent, statutory or otherwise,90 
and it has been invoked by jurists of all jurisprudential philosophies.91 
But the Court’s textualist Justices seem particularly fond of this form of 
argument—and more regularly advocate overruling statutory precedents 
based on it than do their purposivist counterparts. 
Consider, for example, three recent cases: Altria Group, Inc. v. 
Good,92 Holder v. Hall,93 and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.94 
Altria raised the question whether state law claims for fraudulent 
misrepresentation against cigarette manufacturers were preempted by 
the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.95 A majority of the 
Court concluded that such claims were not preempted, relying heavily 
on a prior precedent, Cipollone v. Liggett Group.96 Justice Thomas 
 
90 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (“Another 
traditional justification for overruling a prior case is that a precedent may be a positive 
detriment to coherence and consistency in the law” as when there is “inherent confusion 
created by an unworkable decision”). 
91 See, e.g., Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 283 (1988); 
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 378 (1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 
U.S. 111, 116 (1965). 
92 555 U.S. 70 (2008). 
93 512 U.S. 874 (1994). 
94 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
95 Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(b), 84 Stat. 87, 88 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012)).  
96 Altria, 555 U.S. at 73, 82. Cipollone directed implementing courts to examine each state 
law claim individually and ask whether the claim was predicated “on a duty ‘based on 
smoking and health.’” 505 U.S. 504, 528–29 (1992) (quoting § 1334(b)). 
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dissented, joined by Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Alito.97 His opinion 
criticized the Cipollone predicate-duty test as unduly complicated and 
confusing and called for overruling it, observing that “lower courts have 
consistently expressed frustration at the difficulty in applying the 
Cipollone plurality’s test.”98 The dissent argued that “[t]he Court should 
not retain an interpretive test that has proved incapable of 
implementation” and that “[s]tare decisis considerations carry little 
weight when an erroneous governing decision[n] has created an 
unworkable legal regime.”99 Finally, the dissent noted that Cipollone 
was a plurality decision and argued that it therefore was not binding.100 
Recall also that the majority opinion in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc. invoked unworkability arguments, albeit as a secondary 
justification for refusing to apply Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting 
test to the ADEA.101 After explaining that Title VII and the ADEA were 
different in material respects, the opinion added that “it has become 
evident in the years since [Price Waterhouse] was decided that its 
burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply” and “courts have found 
it particularly difficult to craft an instruction to explain its burden-
shifting framework.”102 Given the difficulties experienced in applying 
Price Waterhouse’s framework, the majority insisted, it made no sense 
to extend that framework to the ADEA.103 By contrast, Justice Stevens’ 
purposivist dissenting opinion insisted that Price Waterhouse directly 
governed construction of the ADEA and lamented “[the majority’s] utter 
disregard of our precedent and Congress’[s] intent.104 The dissent 
 
97 Altria, 555 U.S. at 91. 
98 Id. at 92, 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing lower court opinions). 
99 Id. at 97–98 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 501 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
100 Id. at 96. 
101 557 U.S. 167, 179 (2009). 
102 Id. at 173, 179 (emphasis added). 
103 Id. at 179. 
104 Id. at 182–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“That the Court is construing the ADEA rather 
than Title VII does not justify this departure from precedent. The relevant language in the 
two statutes is identical, and we have long recognized that our interpretations of Title VII’s 
language apply ‘with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive 
provisions of the ADEA “were derived in haec verba from Title VII.”’” (quoting Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)). 
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dismissed the majority’s workability concerns by noting that Congress 
expressly endorsed the “motivating-factor” framework in its 1991 
amendments to Title VII and argued that this legislative endorsement 
should trump any workability objections.105 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Holder v. Hall, joined by Justice 
Scalia, echoed the reasoning of the majority opinion in Gross. There, the 
Court held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) does not 
allow challenges to the size of a government body because there is no 
objective “ideal” governing body size against which the challenged 
governing body can be measured.106 Justice Thomas wrote separately to 
advocate that the Court go much further and engage in “a systematic 
reassessment of [its] interpretation of § 2.”107 Specifically, he argued that 
the Court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles,108 which interpreted 
Section 2 to reach claims of vote “dilution,” should be overruled.109 In 
his view, “the gloss” Gingles placed on the statute “is at odds with the 
terms of the statute and has proved utterly unworkable in practice.”110 
Justice Thomas’s opinion also complained that Gingles was “based on a 
flawed method of statutory construction,” characterized the Gingles 
implementation test as “a disastrous misadventure in judicial 
policymaking,” and argued that “by construing the Act to cover 
potentially dilutive electoral mechanisms, we have immersed the federal 
courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory.”111 
The cases discussed in this Part range in subject matter—from 
antidiscrimination law to patent law, antitrust law, criminal sentencing, 
and preemption. Despite the differences in subject matter, however, 
similar themes about precedents that are “not really statutory 
interpretation”112 or that are too erroneous to deserve adherence resound 
 
105 Id. at 185–87 (“Because Congress has codified a mixed-motives framework for Title 
VII cases—the vast majority of antidiscrimination lawsuits—the Court’s concerns about that 
framework are of no moment.”). 
106 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 885 (1994).  
107 Id. at 892 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement). 
108 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986). 
109 Holder, 512 U.S. at 945 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
110 Id. at 892. 
111 Id. at 892–93, 945. 
112 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
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in the textualist-authored opinions that advocate rejecting a statutory 
precedent. 
Finally, it is worth noting that while this Article focuses on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, committed textualist jurists on other courts also have 
shown a marked proclivity for overruling statutory precedents.113 The 
 
113 A prominent example is the Michigan Supreme Court, which gained a textualist 
majority from 1998 to 1999, when Michigan Governor John Engler appointed four new 
Justices—each an avowed textualist—to the court. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as 
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and The New Modified 
Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1803–04 (2010). Justice Stephen Markman, for example, 
had worked in the Reagan Administration’s Office of Legal Policy and was credited with 
helping to put in place a “new generation of textualist judges.” Id. at 1804; see also Cornell 
W. Clayton, The Politics of Justice: The Attorney General and the Making of Legal Policy 
151 (1992) (describing Markman’s influence in the Office of Legal Policy); T.R. Goldman, 
The Flower of the Reagan Revolution (John Roberts, Jr.), Free Republic (Aug. 4, 2005), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1457017/posts (same). Likewise, Justice Maura 
Corrigan had argued in speeches and law review articles that courts should adopt textualism 
in order to achieve “a disciplined interpretive approach.” Maura D. Corrigan, Textualism in 
Action: Judicial Restraint on the Michigan Supreme Court, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 261, 263–
64 (2004). These textualist appointees quickly overruled numerous statutory precedents; 
indeed, in the newly constituted court’s first five years, its textualist majority overruled more 
statutory precedents than the court had done during any previous period in the state’s history. 
See Gluck, supra, at 1804 & n.195 (citing Corrigan, supra, at 264); Nelson P. Miller, 
“Judicial Politics”: Restoring the Michigan Supreme Court, Mich. B.J., Jan. 2006, at 38; 
Robert A. Sedler, The Michigan Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and Overruling the 
Overrulings, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1911, 1929–30 & n.81 (2009); Clifford W. Taylor, A 
Government of Laws, and Not of Men, 22 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 199, 208 (2005)); Todd C. 
Berg, Marilyn Kelly Named New Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice, Mich. Law. 
Wkly., Jan. 12, 2009 (noting that the court overruled sixty-one precedents between 2000 and 
2005, compared with eighteen in the prior five-year period). {Master: Spacing in this FN} 
For examples of such cases, see Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 132, 135 (Mich. 2003) 
(overruling Koester v. City of Novi, 580 N.W.2d 835 (Mich. 1998)); Gladych v. New Family 
Homes, 664 N.W.2d 705, 706 (Mich. 2003) (overruling Buscaino v. Rhodes, 189 N.W.2d 
202 (Mich. 1971)); Rednour v. Hastings Mutual Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d 562, 564–65, 567 
(Mich. 2003) (overruling Nickerson v. Citizens Mut. Ins., 224 N.W.2d 896 (Mich. 1975)); 
Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 641 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Mich. 2002) (overruling Hadfield v. 
Oakland Co. Drain Comm’r, 422 N.W.2d 205 (Mich. 1988)); Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 648 
N.W.2d 624, 627 (Mich. 2002) (overruling Haske v. Transp. Leasing, 566 N.W.2d 896 
(Mich. 1997)); Brown v. Genesee Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 628 N.W.2d 471, 474 & n.4 (Mich. 
2001) (overruling Green v. Dep’t of Corrections, 192 N.W.2d 491 (Mich. 1971)); Nawrocki 
v. Macomb Cty. Rd. Comm’n, 615 N.W.2d 702, 709, 718 (Mich. 2000) (overruling Pick v. 
Szymczak, 548 N.W.2d 603 (Mich. 1996)); Robinson v. City of Detroit, 613 N.W.2d 307, 
311 (Mich. 2000) (overruling Fiser v. Ann Arbor, 339 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. 1983); Rogers v. 
Detroit, 579 N.W.2d 840 (Mich. 1998)). But see People v. Hawkins, 668 N.W.2d 602, 618, 
622 (Mich. 2003) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (chastising court for disregarding “the strong 
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little that we know about state experiences with statutory stare decisis 
lends support to this Article’s central claim that the disregard for 
statutory stare decisis displayed by textualist Justices on the U.S. 
Supreme Court is no accident but, rather, a natural corollary to the 
textualist jurisprudential approach—or, perhaps, to jurisprudential 
tendencies that make an individual judge likely to associate herself with 
a textualist interpretive philosophy.114 
II. SOME THEORIES AND LESSONS 
It may be tempting, in reviewing the above cases, to conclude that 
textualist Justices’ willingness to abandon statutory stare decisis can be 
explained simply by judicial ideology. After all, the Roberts Court’s 
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices also are its most conservative 
Justices, while its purposivist Justices tend to be more liberal.115 Further, 
several of the cases in which textualist Justices have voted to overrule a 
precedent or refused to apply it to a closely related statute have involved 
antidiscrimination statutes that initially were interpreted in an expansive 
manner—that is, in keeping with liberal policy preferences. Likewise, 
the textualist opinions in the evolving economic theory cases tend to 
support overruling precedents that restrict certain business arrangements 
or make it easier for shareholders to sue corporations—and thus are 
consistent with laissez-faire, corporation-friendly, conservative policy 
preferences. So we could interpret textualist Justices’ economic 
dynamism, stinginess with precedents based on related statutes, and 
heightened readiness to overturn precedents that have proved 
unworkable as merely an effort by the Courts’ conservatives to negate 
precedents adopted by more liberal predecessor Courts. Conversely, we 
could read purposivist Justices’ insistence on following statutory stare 
decisis in those same cases as a corresponding attempt by the Court’s 
liberal jurists to protect liberal precedents. 
 
presumption that a high court’s construction of a statute should be given a heightened stare 
decisis effect”). 
114 See infra note 182.  
115 But cf. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 849, 854 (2013) (book review) (acknowledging this but arguing that there is nothing 
inherently conservative about textualism). 
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There is likely some truth to this account. But while ideological 
considerations certainly may have played some role in the Justices’ votes 
in some of the cases, they provide an imperfect explanation for a number 
of others. The Patent Act case, Kimble, for example, does not seem to 
have a clear liberal-versus-conservative dividing line—indeed, all the 
Justices seemed to agree that the Brulotte rule was a bad one as a matter 
of policy—and an odd assortment of the liberal Justices plus Justices 
Scalia and Kennedy voted to uphold the rule.116 Further, ideology does 
not seem sufficient to explain Justice Thomas’s lone dissents advocating 
overruling statutory precedents in cases such as Kimbrough and Preston, 
where all the other Justices, conservative and liberal alike, voted to 
follow the precedent.117 Moreover, very few of the Court’s opinions 
advocating overruling a statutory precedent garnered all five (or even 
four) of the conservative Justices’ votes.118 Thus, while this Article does 
not mean to discount the role that ideology may have played in some of 
the cases discussed in Part I, it argues that there is more than just 
ideology at work in these cases. 
Indeed, two themes emerge from the cases examined in Part I and 
listed in Appendix I. First, most of the cases involve statutory 
constructions that established a decision-making rule or test for 
implementing a statutory provision, rather than a simple holding that a 
statutory word or phrase means “Y.”119 Second, many of the cases 
involve textualist arguments that a precedent should be overruled 
because it simply “got the meaning of the statute wrong” or was based 
 
116 See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412–13 (2015). 
117 See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114–16 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
118 See infra Appendix I (reporting only three such cases, out of thirty-one). These cases 
were Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (five votes), Altria Group, 
Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) (four votes), and Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (five votes). 
119 See, e.g., Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2407–08, 2412; Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516–18 (2015); Halliburton v. Erica P. John 
Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405-07 (2014); Gross, 557 U.S. at 171–73; John R. Sand & Gravel 
Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–35 (2008); Altria, 555 U.S. at 80–82; Preston, 552 
U.S. at 352–53; Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881–82, 887; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 90–91; State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 12 (1997); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 878, 880 (1994). 
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on an economic theory that has since been “debunked.”120 This Part 
argues that these two observations reflect important, and thus far under-
appreciated, corollaries to textualists’ jurisprudential philosophy. 
Section A explains that textualism’s focus on the statutory text and 
hostility towards judicial policymaking seems to translate into a view 
that statutory decisions which establish a test for implementing a statute 
are somehow less authoritative than decisions that hold that the text of 
“X” provision means “Y.” Section B examines how this 
“implementation test” insight might explain textualist Justices’ 
dismissive treatment of congressional overrides in a number of cases 
that have surprised scholars. Section C suggests two additional 
explanations for textualists’ willingness to overrule statutory precedents: 
(1) textualism’s interpretive methodology lends itself to a “correct 
answer” mindset that makes it difficult for textualist jurists to accept a 
statutory construction they believe “gets it wrong”; and (2) at least some 
textualists view themselves as judicial revolutionaries, seeking to 
reshape how courts interpret statutes, and thus are willing to break a few 
eggs (i.e., overrule a few cases) along the way. 
A. “Implementation Tests” Are Different 
A prominent theme, or argument, that runs through several of the 
cases discussed in Part I is that the precedent the textualist Justices 
would overrule is “not really statutory interpretation” at all but, rather, 
some form of judicial policymaking. Typically, the precedents at issue 
involve a judicial test or rule for implementing a statutory provision as 
opposed to a simple holding that “X” word or phrase means “Y.” That 
is, such cases establish that “ABC” test or rule is to be used to decide 
 
120 See, e.g., Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415–17 (Alito, J., dissenting) (economic theory); 
Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2418 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (economic theory); 
Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–75 (text); Altria, 555 U.S. at 92, 95–96, 106–07 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (text); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457–58, 464 (2008) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting)(text); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 260–61 (2008) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (text); Preston, 552 U.S. at 363 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (text); 
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899–900 (economic theory); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 114–16 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (text); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402–03 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (text); Holder, 512 U.S. at 892, 945 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(text); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670–73 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(text). 
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whether a particular action falls within “X” statutory provision—as 
opposed to that “X statutory provision means Y.” Some of the “not 
really statutory interpretation” cases involve a test or interpretation that 
is only loosely connected to a statutory anchor, such as the test for 
determining when a practice constitutes a “restraint of trade” in the 
economic-theory cases. Implementation tests are also prevalent in cases 
involving antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII (e.g., burdens of 
proof), and procedural statutes, such as those establishing limitations 
periods or jurisdictional rules.121 
The distinction between text-parsing statutory interpretation and 
implementation tests is one that the Justices themselves have hinted at in 
some cases—although any discussion they have offered has been brief 
and undeveloped. In Kimble, for example, the textualist dissenting 
opinion urged the Court to overrule Brulotte on the ground that the rule 
established in Brulotte was “not based on anything that can plausibly be 
regarded as an interpretation of the terms of the Patent Act,” that it was 
“a bald act of policymaking” and “was not really statutory interpretation 
at all.”122 Similarly, in another economic theory case, Halliburton, the 
Court reconsidered a precedent that dictated how investors must prove 
the reliance element of the implied Rule 10b-5 cause of action—a test 
that governed implementation of a regulation.123 The precedent case, 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, created an evidentiary presumption that the price 
of stock traded in an efficient market reflects all public, material 
information.124 Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which advocated 
overruling Basic, argued that “Basic, of course, has nothing to do with 
statutory interpretation. . . . [It] concerned a judge-made evidentiary 
presumption for a judge-made element of the implied 10b-5 private 
cause of action, itself ‘a judicial construct that Congress did not enact in 
the text of the relevant statutes.’”125 Recall that in Holder v. Hall, Justice 
Thomas’s concurring opinion likewise characterized the precedent 
case’s “totality of the circumstances” test for implementing Section 2 of 
 
121 See infra Appendix I. 
122 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
123 134 S. Ct. at 2405. 
124 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245, 249–50 (1988). 
125 Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. 2398 at 2425 (2014) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008)). 
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the Voting Rights Act as a “disastrous misadventure in judicial 
policymaking.”126 
At first blush, such comments may sound like an excuse or a flimsy 
attempt to justify a seemingly heretical departure from statutory stare 
decisis. But on closer consideration, these grumblings about judicial 
policymaking reflect a significant and unappreciated difference between 
textualist and purposivist jurisprudential views about statutory 
constructions that involve implementation tests—as opposed to 
constructions that directly parse statutory language. That is, when the 
precedent interpretation adopts a judge-made implementation test, 
textualists view that interpretation as more like common-law decision-
making than traditional statutory interpretation.127 
Further, because an interpretation that adopts an implementation test 
is not saying, “Here is what Congress enacted into law,” but only, “Here 
is how courts should apply what Congress enacted into law,” and 
because the test is judicially created, textualist Justices view the 
interpretation (and test) as open to revision by subsequent Courts who 
believe the test to be misguided, contrary to statutory text, unworkable, 
costly to implement, or out of step with subsequent legal developments. 
In other words, if any of the reasons cited as justifying the overruling of 
a common-law precedent is present with respect to an implementation-
test precedent, textualist Justices are likely to consider that reason 
sufficient to justify overruling the implementation test. 
One reason textualists give for making such a distinction between 
implementation-test and text-parsing precedents is that the separation-
 
126 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). See 
also discussion infra Part II.C (analyzing the textualists’ “correct answer” mindset and their 
self-image as jurisprudential revolutionaries). 
127 The textualist opinions in the non-antitrust economic-theory cases go out of their way 
to argue that the statutes at issue in those cases are like common-law statutes—because 
securities laws largely have been developed by courts, see Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2425–
26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), or because the precedent case was essentially 
an antitrust case “masquerading” as a patent case, see Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). This Article argues that the fact that the precedents at issue involved 
implementation tests rather than ordinary text-parsing statutory interpretation at least 
contributed to textualist Justices’ view of the original precedents as common-law 
equivalents—and that the implementation-test exception helps explain textualist Justices’ 
willingness to overturn precedents in other cases that do not involve statutes that even 
arguably could be considered “common-law statutes.” 
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of-powers concerns that justify statutory stare decisis are not present—
or at least are significantly diminished—with implementation tests. That 
is, Congress is not necessarily the institution best suited to update or 
correct errors in a judicially created test designed to help lower courts 
implement a statutory provision. Congress does not, for instance, 
monitor how well an implementation test is working in the lower courts 
or pay attention to lower-court criticism of such tests.128 The Supreme 
Court, by contrast, in its role as overseer of the judicial system, might 
more organically be in touch with lower court experiences employing an 
implementation test established by one of its earlier cases.129 
Some of the textualist-authored opinions in the cases discussed in Part 
I and listed in Appendix I have explicitly acknowledged the different 
institutional dynamics at work when a statutory interpretation adopts an 
implementation test versus a text-parsing construction. In Kimble, for 
example, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion insisted that 
we do not give super-duper protection to decisions that do not actually 
interpret a statute. When a precedent is based on a judge-made rule 
and is not grounded in anything that Congress has enacted, we cannot 
“properly place on the shoulders of Congress” the entire burden of 
correcting “the Court’s own error.”130 
Similarly, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Halliburton argued 
that, 
[i]n statutory cases, it is perhaps plausible that Congress watches over 
its enactments and will step in to fix our mistakes, so we may leave to 
Congress the judgment whether the interpretive question is better left 
“‘settled’” or “‘settled right.’” But this rationale is untenable when it 
comes to judge-made law like “implied” private causes of action, 
which we retain a duty to superintend. . . . [W]hen we err in areas of 
 
128 See Barrett, supra note 28, at 342–47 (arguing that Congress has little incentive to 
monitor court of appeals decisions). 
129 Indeed, even apart from the Court’s official role as head of the judicial system, its 
members are likely to have formal and informal interactions with lower-court judges, which 
might give rise to inter-court chatter about cases and precedents.  
130 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Girouard v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69–70 (1946)). 
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judge-made law, we ought to presume that Congress expects us to 
correct our own mistakes—not the other way around.131 
In other words, when the judiciary fashions a test to help courts apply 
the text of a statute, rather than merely identifies the “correct meaning” 
of statutory text, textualists view any problems with that test as within 
the judiciary’s prerogative, as well as its responsibility, to correct. 
Perhaps the reason for this, suggested by Justice Thomas’s discussion in 
Halliburton, is that mistakes in judicial interpretation of the statute’s text 
can or should signal to Congress that that text needs correction or 
clarification; whereas mistakes in a judicially crafted test for 
implementing a statute are more difficult for Congress to correct. 
Indeed, in order to correct an implementation test, Congress would have 
to amend or alter the terms of a judicial holding, rather than the text of a 
statute—or at least would have to mention the judicially created test in 
the text of the corrective amendment. Congress has at times done 
precisely this—the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is a prime example132—but 
such legislative corrections of judicially crafted tests are awkward and 
often themselves meet with judicial resistance in subsequent 
application.133 
Purposivist Justices, by contrast, do not seem to view statutory 
precedents that create implementation tests as less binding than 
precedents that adopt a straightforward holding that a statutory word or 
phrase means “X.” Or, at least, purposivist Justices regularly seem to 
vote to uphold such implementation tests, citing statutory stare decisis. 
What accounts for this difference? One possible explanation is that 
purposivists treat implementation tests differently than do textualists 
because purposivists are, on the whole, more comfortable with tests and 
factors than are textualists. In this sense, the implementation-test divide 
may be a close cousin of the rules–standards divide that tends to break 
along textualist–purposivist lines.134 
 
131 Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2425–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted) (quoting Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 
409, 424 (1986)). 
132 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.  
133 See infra Section II.B.  
134 Briefly, the rules-versus-standards debate acknowledges that judges have a choice, 
when articulating legal policies, between establishing clear, bright-line rules—e.g., “No one 
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As scholars have observed, textualists have shown a heightened 
preference for rules over standards, whereas purposivists and 
intentionalists have proved more comfortable with standards (though not 
necessarily to prefer them over rules).135 Thus, for example, textualists 
are less willing than jurists who subscribe to other interpretive 
approaches to recognize case-by-case exceptions to a statutory rule on 
the ground that the rule is over- or under-inclusive.136 Moreover, 
textualists “enthusiastically deploy canons of construction, with special 
emphasis on the more rule-like of the canons.”137 Accordingly, it is 
possible that textualists are more willing to overrule precedents that 
involve implementation tests at least in part because such tests 
essentially establish “standards”—giving courts guidelines for how to 
apply a statute and leaving significant room for judicial discretion—
rather than fixed rules. Purposivists, on the other hand, may be more 
comfortable with tests that allow for judicial discretion on a case-by-
case basis. Indeed, they may view judicial discretion in the application 
of a statute as a good thing—on the theory that it enables courts to 
ensure that the statute is implemented consistently with Congress’s 
purpose in individual cases. 
On a second, deeper level, the difference between purposivists’ and 
textualists’ attitudes towards implementation test precedents may reflect 
an under-appreciated difference between the two interpretive theories’ 
visions of the proper role of the Court in statutory interpretation. 
Specifically, textualists seem to view the Court as more of a monitor, or 
supervisor, of the lower courts and the legal system as a whole than do 
purposivists. Purposivists, by contrast, seem to view the Court as more 
 
may drive over sixty-five miles per hour”—versus establishing flexible standards—e.g., “No 
one may drive at an excessive speed.” Whereas rules are absolute and straightforward, 
standards are somewhat open-ended and require further judicial evaluation at the 
implementation stage. Whereas rules are predictable, clear, and categorical, standards require 
case-by-case analysis. For general discussions of the distinction between rules and standards, 
see Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. 
Legal Stud. 257, 258 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58–59 (1992).  
135 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 16, at 372–403. 
136 See id. at 381–83. 
137 John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 422 (2005). 
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of a faithful agent of Congress than do textualists. Or perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that both textualists and purposivists view the Court as 
both a monitor and a faithful agent, but that textualists place greater 
emphasis on the monitor role, while purposivists place greater weight on 
the faithful agent role. 
I have elsewhere observed that the Roberts Court’s conservative 
Justices—who also tend to be its most textualist and textualist-leaning 
Justices—seem more focused on ensuring that a particular statutory 
construction works well within the legal system than do their liberal, 
often purposivist, counterparts.138 For example, when these Justices pay 
attention to the practical consequences that a particular interpretation is 
likely to produce, they tend to emphasize administrability concerns—
e.g., whether the interpretation will waste judicial resources, prove 
impossible to administer, or result in unclear or unpredictable rules.139 In 
the context of statutory stare decisis, I believe this translates into a 
greater willingness on the part of these Justices to overrule a statutory 
precedent that is giving lower courts difficulty. Indeed, a number of the 
textualist opinions that advocate overruling statutory precedents have 
cited the problems that lower courts have had implementing the 
precedent, sometimes quoting directly from lower court opinions 
criticizing the precedent.140 
 
138 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: 
An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 Hastings L.J. 221, 225 (2010). 
139 Id. at 226, 244–45. 
140 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 179 (2009) (citing Tyler v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1179 (2d Cir. 1992)) (referring to “the murky water 
of shifting burdens in discrimination cases”); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 97 
(2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142 
(D. Me. 2006)) (“‘[C]ourts remain divided about what the [Cippollone] decision means and 
how to apply it’ and . . . ‘Cipollone’s distinctions, though clear in theory, defy clear 
application.’”); Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum, 
J., dissenting) (citing judicial difficulty in formulating burden-shifting instructions and juror 
difficulty in applying such instructions). See also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that precedent has forced lower courts to 
grapple with inherently political questions); Hilton v. S. C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 
197, 212 (1991) (“It will be difficult, if not impossible, for lower courts to know” how to the 
implement test at issue). See also discussion infra Section II.C (exploring textualists’ 
“correct answer” mindset). 
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This lower-court-monitor function may also explain something 
puzzling about the evolving economic-theory cases. In many of these 
cases, textualist Justices advocated replacing a clear, easy-to-administer 
test or interpretation with one that is more complicated for courts to 
administer. In Kimble, for example, they would have replaced Brulotte’s 
straightforward rule (“No royalties after the patent expires”) with 
antitrust law’s open-ended rule of reason (an “elaborate inquiry” that 
requires courts to conduct “a full-fledged” economic analysis of a 
royalty clause’s likely effect on competition).141 This is curious because, 
as I have shown elsewhere, the textualist Justices have in numerous 
other cases rejected statutory constructions that would be messy to 
implement, citing the practical difficulties and confusion that such 
constructions would produce for lower courts.142 
But textualists’ emphasis on the Court as monitor or supervisor of the 
lower courts readily explains this seeming anomaly: the Court’s 
willingness to adopt the messier test in such cases may stem, in part, 
from the fact that lower courts have found the clear, simple test difficult 
to administer, or have criticized it for some other reason. Kimble is again 
a good example. Although the Brulotte precedent adopted a simple, 
easy-to-administer rule—whereas the dissenters’ preferred “rule of 
reason” test was more complicated—lower courts charged with 
administering the Brulotte rule had severely criticized it.143 Thus, the 
dissenting Justices may have viewed their monitoring role as best 
fulfilled by jettisoning a precedent that lower courts had denounced—
 
141 See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2408–09, 2411 (2015) (citing Brief for 
Petitioner at 45). Indeed, the majority opinion pointed this out and stressed the simplicity of 
the Brulotte rule in comparison to the “rule of reason” advocated by the dissenters. See id. at 
2411. See also, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418–19 (2014) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (advocating replacing a simple rule that presumed 
reliance on defendant’s misrepresentations with a messy, fact-specific judicial inquiry into 
whether particular plaintiffs in fact relied on defendant’s misstatements); Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (replacing Dr. Miles’s per se rule 
against vertical price restraints with them the “rule of reason” test). 
142 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 
87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1465, 1507–12 (2012). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., 
Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation: Statutes and the Creation of Public 
Policy 1210 & n.178 (5th ed. 2014) (citing this principle). 
143 See Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1019–20 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2007); Scheiber v. 
Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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even though that precedent established a test that was seemingly simple 
on its face. 
Purposivist Justices, by contrast, may be more willing to stick with 
old implementation-test precedents than are their textualist counterparts, 
even in the face of lower-court criticism, because they view the act of 
creating an implementation test as a judicial effort to effectuate 
Congress’s goals in enacting the statute. That is, because purposivists 
are not focused exclusively on the text of the statute, they may not view 
the judicial adoption of an implementation test that is one step removed 
from the text as a “bald act of judicial policymaking.”144 Rather, they 
may view such tests as part and parcel of the judicial process of ensuring 
that Congress’s purpose is fulfilled when a statute is applied to concrete 
legal disputes. 
Moreover, once the Court has put forth an interpretation that does its 
best to give effect to Congress’s purpose—whether that interpretation 
takes the form of an implementation test or a text-parsing statutory 
construction—purposivists view it as the exclusive province of the 
principal, Congress, to decide whether that interpretation accords with 
the statute’s purpose and to correct the interpretation if necessary. As the 
majority opinion in Kimble argued, 
[W]e apply statutory stare decisis even when a decision has 
announced a “judicially created doctrine” designed to implement a 
federal statute. All our interpretive decisions, in whatever way 
reasoned, effectively become part of the statutory scheme, subject 
(just like the rest) to congressional change. Absent special 
justification, they are balls tossed into Congress’s court, for 
acceptance or not as that branch elects.145 
Because judicial fulfillment of statutory purpose is purposivists’ 
lodestar—rather than judicial cracking of a linguistic code—purposivists 
do not view implementation test precedents as different in kind, or less 
deserving of deference, than ordinary statutory interpretation precedents. 
Moreover, they do not seem to view their primary role in superintending 
such tests to be to ensure that lower courts are able to administer them. 
 
144 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
145 Id. at 2409 (citations omitted).  
COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2018] Textualism and Statutory Precedents 193 
 
Rather, they seem to view their role to be to ensure that any 
implementation test they adopt continues to effectuate Congress’s 
purpose as times change—and they accordingly view Congress, rather 
than the courts, as the appropriate arbiter of such tests’ effectiveness. 
Indeed, because purposivism as an interpretive methodology is more 
focused on legislative intent and is comfortable making inferences about 
such intent based on legislative behavior, it makes sense that 
purposivists are far more willing than their textualist colleagues to take 
their cues from Congress when it comes to overturning a precedent. 
Purposivists also seem more willing to assume that Congress pays 
attention to judicially crafted implementation tests and to infer 
congressional approval of an implementation test from legislative 
inaction following the adoption of such a test.146 In the purposivist 
jurist’s eyes, the judicial invalidation of an implementation test that 
Congress has left in place—thereby signaling its implicit approval, much 
as traditional principals signal ratification of their agents’ actions 
through silence—may seem like the act of a faithless legislative agent. 
Appendix I lists thirty-one Supreme Court cases in which at least one 
member of the Court advocated overruling a statutory precedent. Of 
these thirty-one cases, only nine contained explicit arguments that the 
precedent at issue constituted judicial policymaking or was not “real 
statutory interpretation” and therefore was not entitled to the super-
strong presumption of correctness afforded by statutory stare decisis.147 
But over half of the cases in the Appendix (seventeen of thirty-one, or 
54.8%) involved implementation test precedents.148 Because the cases 
 
146 See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress has 
repeatedly refused to overturn the Dr. Miles’s per se rule). 
147 See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2528–29 (2015) (Thomas, J. 
dissenting) (arguing that the disparate impact test was created by an agency, not Congress, 
and that it defies the statute’s text); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2398, 2425–27 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 
555 U.S. 70, 106–07 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 
85, 114–16 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899–900, 905 (2007); 
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892–93 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 675–76 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); City of 
Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); infra Appendix I. 
148 See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2408–09 (“unreasonable restraint of trade” test); Tex. Dep’t of 
Hous., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–18 (disparate-impact test); Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2409 
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listed in the Appendix are based on word searches and are not 
exhaustive, I do not want to overstate the significance of these 
percentages.149 But these crude numbers suggest that when the members 
of the Court are willing to overturn a statutory precedent, they are often 
dealing with a precedent they may view as less binding because it 
imposes a decision-making rule for implementing a statute rather than 
directly construes the statute’s text. 
B. Implementation Tests, Legislative Overrides, and “Shadow 
Precedents” 
The implementation-test distinction illuminated in Section A has 
important implications not just for the Court’s treatment of its own 
statutory precedents—but for its treatment of the related category of 
statutory precedents that Congress chooses to override by amendment or 
new law. This Section discusses the phenomenon of “shadow 
precedents”—that is, statutory precedents that Congress has overridden 
 
(“reliance on material misrepresentation” test); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 112–14 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“reasonableness” of criminal sentences); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 
167, 176–77 (2009) (burden of proof rule for demonstrating discrimination “because of” 
age); Altria, 555 U.S. at 76–77 (test for determining whether state law is preempted); John 
R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008) (test for whether 
statute of limitations is jurisdictional); Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885–86 (“unreasonable restraint 
of trade” test); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“unreasonable restraint of 
trade” test); Holder, 512 U.S. at 880, 880 n.1 (“totality of the circumstances” test under the 
Voting Rights Act); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275–
77 (1988) (test for appealability of a district court order denying motion to stay or dismiss); 
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631–33 (test for determining whether an employer engaged in “sex” 
discrimination); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 810 (standard for imposing liability on cities under § 
1983); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113–15 (1985) (test for distinguishing questions of 
fact from questions of law); Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50 (1977) 
(“unreasonable restraint of trade” test); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers AFL-CIO v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 137–38 (1976) (test for 
“unfair labor practice” under NLRA); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 
393 (1970) (test for determining whether there is a cause of action for wrongful death); infra 
Appendix I.  
149 Most of the cases in the Appendix were identified through a search of the Westlaw 
database using the parameters “‘stare decisis’ /s overrule!” I reviewed the search results and 
eliminated cases that failed to advocate overruling a statutory precedent (e.g., cases that 
discussed overruling a constitutional precedent). I also supplemented this word search with 
cases I independently knew to contain arguments in favor of overruling a statutory 
precedent. 
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but that lower courts and even the Supreme Court itself nevertheless 
continue to follow.150 It posits that part of the reason for textualists’ 
reluctance to give full effect to congressional overrides in such cases 
may be that the overridden precedent established an implementation test, 
which the Court views as its responsibility—rather than Congress’s—to 
update. 
As noted earlier, one of the central justifications for heightened 
deference to statutory precedents is that when a judicial construction of a 
statute is incorrect, Congress has the power to correct it. Several 
academic studies have sought to measure empirically how often 
Congress actually steps in to override the Supreme Court’s statutory 
interpretation decisions.151 Some of these studies attempt to identify 
factors that correlate with congressional enactment of an override, such 
as statutory subject matter or the interpretive tools (e.g., plain meaning) 
the Court used to construe the statute.152 Two recent qualitative studies 
have examined how courts respond when Congress in fact overrides a 
statutory interpretation precedent. Relying on observations in the 
employment-law field, these studies show that courts sometimes give 
surprisingly limited reach to congressional override statutes—often 
continuing to apply overridden precedents to new situations that at least 
arguably should be covered by the override.153 
The implementation-test distinction identified in Section A suggests a 
new explanation for the “shadow precedent” phenomenon. Insofar as the 
 
150 I borrow this term from Deborah Widiss. See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4. 
151 See sources cited supra note 4. See also Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the 
Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in Great Theatre: The 
American Congress in the 1990s, at 224, 233-40 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. 
Patterson eds., 1998) (using empirical methods to determine when Congress will be more 
likely to overrule a decision by the Court); James Buatti & Richard L. Hasen, Conscious 
Congressional Overriding of the Supreme Court, Gridlock, and Partisan Politics, 93 Texas L. 
Rev. See Also 263 (2015) (measuring the number of “conscious” congressional overrides); 
Matthew R. Christiansen, William N. Eskridge Jr. & Sam N. Thypin-Bermeo, The 
Conscious Congress: How Not to Define Overrides, 93 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 289 (2015) 
(critiquing whether “conscious” overrides is a helpful metric in assessing Congress-Court 
relations).  
152 See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1387–1413; Eskridge, supra note 4, at 
343–49.  
153 See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4; Widiss, Undermining Overrides, supra 
note 4.  
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Court’s textualist and textualist-leaning Justices view implementation 
test precedents as the equivalent of common-law rulemaking, rather than 
traditional statutory interpretation, they may believe that revisions to 
such tests should be the exclusive province of the judiciary, rather than 
Congress. Indeed, they may regard legislative tinkering with such tests 
as an illegitimate usurpation of judicial authority. Accordingly, these 
Justices may be inclined to give a narrow reading to congressional 
overrides of judicially crafted tests. That is, textualist Justices may take 
the view that when the Court adopts a judge-made test for implementing 
a statute, the Court should be willing to change the test if it proves 
wrong or unworkable—much as the Court does with constitutional and 
common-law decisions. However, when an implementation test is 
changed by Congress, through an override, these same Justices may take 
the view that the Court should read that change narrowly and give 
meaning only to the precise change Congress enacts. In other words, 
textualists may view congressional overrides of judicially crafted 
implementation tests somewhat like courts in an earlier era viewed 
statutes in derogation of the common law—as pesky legislative 
intrusions to be given limited effect.154 
Indeed, in some cases it almost seems as if the Court’s textualists 
have created a de facto clear-statement rule for congressional overrides 
of implementation test precedents.155 That is, they appear to have 
adopted an unspoken rule that the original shadow precedent continues 
to apply in all situations other than those that are clearly covered by the 
override. Thus, if Congress wishes for the override to apply broadly, it 
must either explicitly declare that the override is meant to completely 
repeal the precedent, or it must amend every related statute that might be 
construed in light of the precedent to make clear that the precedent no 
 
154 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The 
Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 875 (1991) (“A 
century ago, statutes were considered intrusions into the pristine order of the common law”); 
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 33–35 (1983). 
155 The clear statement rule is a presumption, or canon, of statutory interpretation that 
requires exceptional clarity in the text of a statute before the statute may be construed to 
overcome an important background norm (e.g., federalism). For a comprehensive overview 
of clear statement rules, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 
593 (1992).  
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longer applies to that statute. By contrast, these same Justices have been 
quite generous in their willingness to adopt sweeping judicial 
overrulings of implementation-test precedents. In other words, the 
Justices seem to have adopted a common-law-like stare decisis rule for 
the judicial review of implementation test precedents, but a clear-
statement-like rule for the judicial review of congressional overrides of 
implementation-test precedents. Paradoxically, and notwithstanding 
textualism’s oft-asserted claim to promoting judicial deference to 
congressional choices,156 the upshot is that textualists are regularly 
unwilling to give full effect to congressional overrides. 
Consider an example involving the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
(“CRA”), which overrode several earlier Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting Title VII. One of the overridden cases was Lorance v. AT&T 
Technologies,157 which involved a challenge to a seniority system 
brought by a group of female employees. The seniority system had been 
in place for several years, but a new round of layoffs based on the 
system had occurred shortly before the plaintiffs filed their charge with 
the EEOC.158 Title VII provides that in order to preserve eligibility to 
file an employment-discrimination claim, an employee must file a 
charge with the EEOC within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred.”159 The question presented was when 
Title VII’s statute of limitations began to run and whether plaintiffs filed 
their charge in a timely manner.160 A divided Court ruled that the statute 
of limitations for challenging a seniority system begins to run when the 
seniority system is first adopted, not when it is applied to disadvantage a 
member of a protected class and that plaintiffs, accordingly, had not 
filed their charge in a timely manner.161 This was a classic example of 
 
156 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 16, at 103 (“By giving priority to semantic context 
(when clear), textualism offers a more defensible account of legislative supremacy . . . .”); 
Manning, supra note 18, at 18 (“The root of the textualist position is . . . in straightforward 
faithful agent theory.”). 
157 490 U.S. 900, 901–03 (1989). 
158 See id. at 902. 
159 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). 
160 Lorance, 490 U.S. at 903. 
161 Id. at 911–13. 
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“implementation test” statutory interpretation, in that it established a rule 
for administering the statute of limitations.  
The CRA overrode Lorance by amending the general rule regarding 
time limits to add that, with respect to seniority systems, “an unlawful 
employment practice occurs . . . when the seniority system is adopted, 
when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a 
person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority 
system . . . .”162  Despite this override, courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have continued to apply Lorance as a “shadow precedent.”163 
Most notoriously, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, the Court’s 
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices invoked Lorance to give an 
exceedingly stingy reading to the 1991 CRA.164 Ledbetter involved a 
claim of pay discrimination, rather than a challenge to a seniority 
system, but its facts otherwise paralleled Lorance’s. Lilly Ledbetter 
claimed that she had received poor employment evaluations because of 
her sex and that the evaluations resulted in a rate of pay that was 
substantially lower than the pay of men at the company with similar 
experience and qualifications.165 The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision 
that cited Lorance extensively, ruled that Ledbetter’s charge had not 
been timely filed because most of the performance evaluations and pay 
decisions about which she complained had been made several years 
earlier, outside the 180-day charging period specified by Title VII.166 
The majority opinion referenced the 1991 CRA override only in a 
footnote, observing that “[a]fter Lorance, Congress amended Title VII to 
cover the specific situation involved in that case.”167 It characterized the 
override as applying “only” to seniority systems and argued that the 
basic reasoning underlying the Lorance decision had not been called into 
question.168 
 
162 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)) 
(emphasis added). 
163 See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4. 
164 550 U.S. 618, 620 (2007). 
165 See id. at 621–22. 
166 Id. at 623–29.  
167 Id. at 627 n.2.  
168 Id. A similar example involves the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”), 
which overrode the Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
125 (1976). See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4, at 552–53. Gilbert addressed 
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Justice Ginsburg and the other purposivist Justices dissented, arguing 
that the override “superseded” the decision in Lorance and made it “no 
longer effective.”169 The dissent insisted that the override demonstrated 
Congress’s view that Lorance was “glaringly at odds with the purposes 
of Title VII” and cited legislative history that showed that Congress 
intended the override to eliminate reliance on both the reasoning and the 
holding of Lorance.170 Congress quickly overrode the Court’s decision 
with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.171 
 
whether a disability policy that provided benefits to employees for all short-term disabilities 
except pregnancy discriminated on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 551. A majority of the Court reasoned that the plan did not 
discriminate on the “basis” of “sex” because “sex” was not the explicit distinguishing factor. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135. Rather, there were two groups of potential recipients of disability 
benefits, “pregnant women and nonpregnant persons,” and although the “first group is 
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.” Id. (quoting Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 n.20 (1974)). Because there was no class of disabilities for 
which men were covered and women were not, the Court found there was no sex 
discrimination. Id. at 139. 
 Congress quickly overrode Gilbert with the PDA. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)). The PDA added a definition of “sex” as 
used in Title VII, providing that: “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.” § 1, 92 Stat. at 2076. The legislative history of the PDA made clear that 
Congress intended for the override to “return” the law to what many believed it had meant 
prior to the decision in Gilbert. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750 (“It is the committee’s view that the dissenting Justices correctly 
interpreted the Act.”); Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4, at 552. Yet in In re Union 
Pacific Railroad Employment Practices Litigation, the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion authored 
by a textualist-leaning judge, rejected plaintiffs’ claim that denial of insurance coverage for 
contraceptives violates Title VII. 479 F.3d 936, 942–43 (8th Cir. 2007). The court construed 
the language of the PDA narrowly, holding that contraceptives are not “related” to 
pregnancy for purposes of analysis under the PDA. Id. at 942. It then performed a “separate” 
sex discrimination analysis and held that there was no sex discrimination on the grounds that 
Union Pacific’s plan denied coverage for both men and women and deemed the fact that 
prescription coverage currently was available only for women irrelevant—the reasoning 
from Gilbert that Congress rejected in the PDA. See id. at 943–45 & n.5. 
169 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
170 See id. at 652–53 (alteration in original) (quoting Sponsors’ Interpretative 
Memorandum, 137 Cong. Rec. 29046, 29047 (1991)) (“This legislation should be interpreted 
as disapproving the extension of [Lorance] to contexts outside of seniority systems.”). 
171 Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (Jan. 29, 2009) (codified in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
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Thus far, the literature on shadow precedents has treated continued 
judicial reliance on overridden cases as a problematic but 
understandable result of judicial confusion about the extent to which 
Congress intends for an override to cancel out a prior precedent.172 
Accordingly, proposals for reform have tended to suggest new, default 
interpretive rules designed to give broad reach to legislative overrides.173 
But the implementation-test exception identified in Part II.A suggests 
another, more deliberate, explanation for the shadow precedent 
phenomenon. Perhaps courts are not merely confused about the extent to 
which an override has repudiated a prior precedent; perhaps they are 
intentionally seeking to limit the effect of a legislative override of a 
judicially crafted test because they believe that the judiciary, rather than 
Congress, is best situated to make changes to such tests. In the case of 
Ledbetter and Lorance, for example, perhaps the textualist Justices 
viewed Lorance’s implementation rule—that a discriminatory practice 
must be challenged when it occurs rather than when its effects are felt—
as a common-law-like rule that courts should update based on their lived 
experiences with the rule. Although they recognized that the legislature 
formally has the power to override the rule, they may have viewed the 
override skeptically, as an intrusion by the legislative branch into a 
function—implementation—that belongs to the judiciary. Accordingly, 
they may have felt bound to give effect to the override only to the extent 
that it clearly repudiated the precedent. Put differently, the Justices in 
the Ledbetter majority may have viewed questions about when a statute 
of limitations should begin to run as “judicial administration” questions 
that courts are better equipped than legislatures to answer and may, 
accordingly, have viewed Congress’s override as a legislative intrusion 
whose reach they were justified in limiting.174 
 
172 See, e.g., Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4, at 514–15; Widiss, Undermining 
Overrides, supra note 4, at 860–61, 933. 
173 See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4, at 566–75 (proposing a “rebuttable 
presumption” that congressional overrides signal a need for “fresh” statutory analysis); 
Widiss, Undermining Overrides, supra note 4, at 933–41 (emphasis omitted) (suggesting that 
the Court provide “fresh” statutory analysis “consistent with the meaning Congress signaled 
it ascribes to the relevant language”). 
174 For instance, textualists may have believed the Lorance rule was necessary to keep 
judicial dockets manageable—or at least that the judiciary, rather than the legislature, is best-
situated to make such determinations. 
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Of course, the Ledbetter decision also seems to have been motivated, 
in part, by ideological concerns: the Justices who gave the 1991 CRA a 
narrow reading were also the Court’s most conservative Justices, 
ideologically indisposed to favor Title VII claims. This Article does not 
intend to suggest that ideology is not at work in such cases; rather, it 
aims to show that there may be jurisprudential reasons, in addition to 
ideology, that help explain the Justices’ “shadow” reliance on precedents 
such as Lorance.175  
Specifically, the Court, or its textualist-leaning Justices, may be 
holding congressional revisions to judicially created implementation 
tests to a clear-statement standard that they do not apply to judicial 
revisions of the Court’s own common-law-style tests for implementing a 
statute. In other words, the textualist Justices may view it as part of the 
Court’s role to reconsider its own implementation tests based on 
practical experiences with the test, but they may view it as suspect—and 
an occasion for a limiting judicial check-and-balance—when the 
impetus for changes to an implementation test comes from Congress, as 
a corrective of a judicial decision. Moreover, these Justices may believe 
that a different standard of review should apply when they are reviewing 
the new statutory text of a congressional override (a clear-statement 
rule) than when they are revisiting a judicial interpretation of a statute 
(common-law standard of review). 
Purposivist jurists, by contrast, generally have been willing to give 
broad effect to congressional overrides of statutory precedents that adopt 
implementation tests—as Justice Ginsburg’s Ledbetter dissent 
illustrates. One reason for this may be that, as noted earlier,176 
purposivists are more focused on legislative intent than are their 
textualist colleagues—and thus are more willing to take their cues from 
Congress when evaluating the scope and meaning of an override. For 
example, purposivist jurists are, as a matter of methodological 
preference, far more willing to give effect to materials in the legislative 
record that demonstrate congressional intent for an override to apply 
broadly or indicate that Congress thought the Court’s original 
 
175See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text for more on why ideology does not fully 
explain textualist Justices’ willingness to abandon statutory stare decisis.  
176 See discussion supra Part II. 
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interpretation erroneous and meant for the override to completely 
repudiate the precedent. These are all facets of the “faithful agent” 
versus “monitoring” role that divides purposivists and textualists: 
purposivists view it as their role to fulfill Congress’s design, which 
entails giving full effect to Congress’s overrides of the Court’s own 
statutory interpretations, while textualists view it as the Court’s role to 
monitor rules of the Court’s own making, including common-law-like 
tests for implementing statutes. Moreover, textualists seem to view 
Congress as a poor judge of the effectiveness of judicially crafted 
implementation tests, and Congress’s power to interfere with such tests 
as limited only to direct changes Congress makes to the text of the 
relevant statutes. 
C. Textualism’s Psychology 
In addition to the implementation-test distinction, two other factors 
appear to contribute to textualist Justices’ readiness to overrule statutory 
precedents. First, textualist Justices appear prone to a “correct answer” 
mindset, such that their jurisprudential commitment to precision and 
belief in a single correct statutory meaning may make it especially 
difficult for them to follow a precedent they view as inaccurate. Second, 
at least some of the textualist Justices seem to see themselves as 
jurisprudential revolutionaries, whose function is to overthrow the old, 
corrupt, judicial order—including statutory precedents arrived at through 
the use of improper interpretive tools such as legislative history. This 
Section explores each of these factors in turn. 
1. A “Correct Answer” Mindset 
At its core, textualism is a method of statutory interpretation that aims 
to identify the plain meaning of a statute’s text—that is, the simple, 
basic, obvious meaning.177 It is founded on a belief that most statutes 
have an easily identifiable meaning,178 and there is some evidence that 
 
177 See, e.g., Webster’s New World Dictionary 570 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d Concise ed. 
1982) (listing third meaning for the word “plain” as “clearly understood; evident; obvious” 
and sixth meaning as “not complicated; simple”). 
178 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 
39 & n.169 (2006) (citing Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
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textualist judges tend to find a plain meaning more often than do other 
jurists.179 Textualist judges, particularly in the post-Scalia era, tend to 
presume that there is a correct, definitive answer to every (or nearly 
every) interpretive question and to treat the task of statutory 
interpretation like a puzzle.180 If the correct answer cannot be found 
through a plain reading of the text, then the dictionary, Latin maxims, 
other sections of the statute, and even the Court’s interpretations of other 
statutes using similar language should be consulted to decipher the 
statute’s meaning. Such bounded interpretive aids are trusted to lead the 
Court to the correct construction. As Justice Scalia and co-author 
Professor Bryan Garner put it in a book designed to serve as a textualist 
primer on statutory interpretation, “[M]ost interpretive questions have a 
right answer. Variability in interpretation is a distemper.”181 
This Article suggests that textualism’s relentless focus on identifying 
the “correct” statutory meaning may have an under-appreciated side 
effect for its proponents. That is, textualists’ “correct meaning” 
emphasis may make it especially difficult for them to follow a precedent 
that they believe gets the answer to the interpretive puzzle wrong. In 
other words, something about the textualist approach—what we can 
 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 521) (“Some interpreters have great confidence 
in the determinacy of law and tend to view their initial reading of a text as the single, correct 
reading.”).  
179 See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-
Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better than Judicial 
Literalism, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1231, 1266, 1275 & n.235 (1996) (explaining that 
textualists rarely believe they must defer to agency interpretations because they usually find 
clear meaning in the text); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 521 (acknowledging that he “finds more 
often . . . that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with 
other laws.”). See also Krishnakumar, supra note 18, at 849 (demonstrating that most 
textualist Justices invoked plain meaning at higher rates than non-textualist Justices during 
the Roberts Court’s first 6.5 terms). 
180 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. 
U. L.Q. 351, 354, 372 (1994) (describing how textualists’ puzzle-solving approach often 
results in answers); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An 
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 
749, 779 (1995) (comparing the textualist interpretive process to solving a puzzle); see also 
Mank, supra note 179, at 1257 (noting textualists’ conviction and certainty about their 
method). 
181 Scalia & Garner, supra note 6, at 6. 
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perhaps call the “correct answer” mindset—may make it particularly 
painful for textualist Justices to accept an incorrect statutory 
construction simply because it was first in time.182 As a result, the 
famous tenet that “in most matters it is more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right”183 may 
prove challenging for textualists to adhere to in practice. 
In arguing that textualists are prone to a “correct answer” mindset, I 
do not mean to suggest that purposivist and pragmatist jurists do not also 
seek the “best” or “correct” reading of a statute. Identifying the “best” 
statutory construction is a goal shared by every interpretive approach. 
But different interpretive theories define “best answer” in different 
ways. Whereas textualists tend to argue that there is one correct way to 
read a statute, purposivists and pragmatists tend to acknowledge that 
there is often more than one fair way to construe a statute and that their 
preferred construction is “best” in light of Congress’s purpose or in light 
of the practical consequences it will produce. Jurists who subscribe to 
purposivist or pragmatic interpretive theories do not argue that the 
construction they advance is the only plausible one, that there is only 
one valid way to read the statute, or that other readings are illegitimate. 
Textualist jurists, by contrast, regularly make such claims—for example, 
arguing that the statute’s text is “dispositive”;184 calling opposing 
constructions of the statute “sheer applesauce”;185 and using dictionary 
definitions to insist that the term at issue cannot mean what an opposing 
 
182 It is also, of course, possible that an individual judge’s predisposition to a “correct 
answer” mindset may be what attracts the judge to textualism as an interpretive approach. It 
is hard to say which comes first, textualism or a “correct answer” mindset. In hypothesizing 
about the reasons that underlie textualist jurists’ relaxed approach to statutory stare decisis, I 
do not mean to imply that textualism causes any particular kind of thinking, rather than the 
other way around. This Article’s intent is merely to note a correlation between textualism 
and a “correct answer” mindset. Thanks to Professor Maggie Lemos for pressing me to 
clarify this. 
183 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
184 See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 464 (2008) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 340 (2002). 
185 Zuni Pub. Sch. District No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 113 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). See also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[p]ure applesauce”). 
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opinion construes it to mean.186 This textualist disdain for interpretations 
that do not square with dictionary definitions—or that are identified 
through the use of “improper” interpretive aids, such as purpose or 
legislative history—may in turn make it more difficult for textualists to 
accept statutory precedents that they believe “get it wrong,” even in the 
name of stability and continuity.187 
A significant literature has recognized the impact of textualists’ 
“correct answer” mindset in the context of judicial review of agency 
statutory interpretations—arguing that textualist judges are more likely 
to refuse to defer to agency interpretations. Specifically, scholars have 
argued that textualism is more likely than other interpretive approaches 
to lead judges to find that a statute has a “plain meaning” and, 
accordingly, to deny deference to an administrative agency’s contrary 
construction of the statute.188 As Professor Thomas Merrill has argued, 
“Textualism . . . tends to make statutory interpretation an exercise in 
ingenuity—an attitude that may be less conducive to deference to the 
decisions of other institutions than the dry archival approach associated 
with intentionalism.”189 
A similar effect appears to be at work with textualism and statutory 
stare decisis—except that in this context textualists often deny deference 
to the interpretations made by predecessor courts, rather than 
administrative agencies. Recall, for example, that in CBOCS West, Inc. 
 
186 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731–33 (2006) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (reasoning that the term “waters of the United States” cannot include dry 
channels through which water occasionally flows because the dictionary defines “water” as 
“streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,” or 
“flowing or moving masses”); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 
(1994) (citations omitted) (holding that a statute authorizing an agency “to modify” rates 
does not confer power to make fundamental changes because “[v]irtually every dictionary 
we are aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to change moderately or in minor fashion”).  
187 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670–73 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (calling majority’s defense of precedent based on congressional inaction a 
“canard”).  
188 See Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A 
Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 175, 198–99 
(1992) (“Confidence in statutory meaning is likely to keep a textualist judge in Chevron’s 
nondeferential step one.”); Merrill, supra note 180, at 357–58 (discussing the impact of 
textualism on Chevron deference); Pierce, supra note 180, at 752 (discussing the Court’s 
extreme use of textualism to the exclusion of other factors). 
189 Merrill, supra note 180, at 354 (emphasis added). 
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v. Humphries, discussed in Part I.B, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice 
Scalia, insisted that the precedent at issue did not interpret Section 1982 
to support a retaliation claim, but that even if it did, the precedent should 
be rejected because it incorrectly construed the statute’s text.190 
Similarly, Justice Thomas’s dissent in Preston v. Ferrer, listed in 
Appendix I, argued that the precedent at issue in that case should be 
overruled because it was simply wrong, both as a matter of text and 
context, to hold that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to state 
courts.191 This type of “the precedent is just plain wrong!” argument 
features prominently in a number of other cases listed in Appendix I.192 
The “correct answer” mindset also may play a role in textualists’ 
eagerness to overrule precedents based on discredited economic 
theories. That is, textualists’ call to overrule in such cases may not be so 
much about updating the statute to reflect modern understandings—a 
distinctly purposivist or pragmatic goal that seems oddly incongruous 
with textualism—as much as about the scholarly consensus that the 
economic theory supporting the precedent is flawed. That is, textualists’ 
“correct answer” mindset may translate into a powerful urge to correct 
interpretations based on a now-refuted economic theory, so that an entire 
line of legal doctrine does not continue to rest on a false foundation. 
Whereas jurists who subscribe to other interpretive theories may be 
willing to wait for Congress to update the law when new economic 
understandings or data prove an original judicial interpretation wrong, 
textualists may find it more offensive to leave a clearly recognized error 
 
190 553 U.S. 442, 464–70 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
191 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing prior cases that analyzed 
contemporary case law and other provisions of the FAA). 
192 See Altria Grp., v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 92, 95–96, 106–07 (2008) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the “plurality’s atextual approach” because “the text speaks for 
itself”); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 260–61 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted) (asserting that the precedent engaged in an “amazing display of 
interpretive gymnastics” and was “a patently ‘revisionist construction of the Act’”); Clark v. 
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402–03 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the precedent 
interpretation is “untenable” and “[t]he mere fact that Congress can overturn our cases by 
statute is no excuse for failing to overrule a statutory precedent of ours that is clearly 
wrong”); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892, 945 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (calling precedent “at odds with the terms of the statute” and “based on a flawed 
method of statutory construction”); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 670–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Weber rewrote the statute it purported to construe.”); infra Appendix I. 
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on the books—and in a position to distort future interpretations. In a 
sense, then, scholarly consensus may substitute for clear statutory text in 
these cases and textualists may be unwilling to accept a precedent that 
contradicts such consensus in much the same way that they have 
difficulty with precedents that contradict the statute’s text. As Justice 
Thomas put it in his concurring opinion in Halliburton, “Principles of 
stare decisis do not compel us to save Basic’s muddled logic and 
armchair economics.”193 
As Appendix I and the case examples in Part I demonstrate, the 
Court’s two most committed textualists, Justices Thomas and Scalia, 
appear to be most fond of this type of “the precedent is just plain 
wrong!” argument. Justice Thomas in particular seems to have difficulty 
reconciling the “correct answer” mindset with the doctrine of statutory 
stare decisis. He has regularly authored opinions that advocate 
overruling precedents because they are “just plain wrong!”194—and this 
argument has featured prominently in the cases in which he alone has 
voted to overturn.195 This is in part because Justice Thomas is a bit of a 
revolutionary with respect to judicial methodology, as discussed further 
in the next Section.196 Justice Scalia, too, advocated overturning 
precedents on the ground that they were erroneous—although less often 
and less consistently than Justice Thomas.197 Notably, Justice Scalia 
 
193 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2425 (2014) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
194 See supra note 192. In fact, Justice Thomas criticized a precedent’s textual analysis in 
eleven of the thirteen precedent-challenging opinions in Appendix I that he authored.  
195 See Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 260–61 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Preston, 552 U.S. at 363 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114–15 (2007) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
196 See infra Part II.C.2. Justice Thomas is also unusually willing to overrule constitutional 
precedents if the original opinion was not based on an originalist methodology. See Jeffrey 
Rosen, Originalism, Precedent, and Judicial Restraint, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 129, 130 
(2011) (“According to Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas would overrule any precedent that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning.”). But this view is at least consistent 
with the rule that constitutional precedents are entitled to a relaxed form of stare decisis—a 
result of the difficulty legislators face in amending the Constitution, which has made the 
Court the de facto actor capable of correcting mistakes of constitutional interpretation. By 
contrast, Justice Thomas’s readiness to overrule statutory precedents based on inaccuracy 
cuts against the longstanding statutory stare decisis rule. 
197 Justice Scalia joined four of the opinions Justice Thomas authored that made a “the 
precedent is just plain wrong!” argument and joined two of three opinions advocating 
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sometimes voted to follow statutory stare decisis despite his strong 
belief that the precedent was wrongly decided—including in cases in 
which he had dissented from the opinion that established the 
precedent.198 Justice Scalia thus seemed to strike more of a balance 
between “getting it right” and adhering to statutory stare decisis than 
does Justice Thomas.199 The other textualist or textualist-leaning 
Justices, by contrast, only rarely joined an opinion citing the 
erroneousness of a prior Court’s statutory analysis as a justification for 
overturning a statutory precedent.200  
2. Textualism as Revolution 
Textualist jurists’ readiness to overturn statutory precedents may also 
be explained, in part, by the fact that the most committed among them 
 
overruling based on an evolving economic theory. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 
167, 178–79 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s precedent is plainly wrong); CBOCS West, 
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 469–70 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); Altria, 555 
U.S. at 106 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); Holder, 512 U.S. at 945 (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (same); Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2417–27 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (espousing an evolving economic theory); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–92 (2007) (same). Scalia also authored one opinion himself 
arguing that a precedent should be overturned because it was simply incorrect. See Johnson, 
480 U.S. at 672–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
198 See, e.g., Preston, 552 U.S. at 353. Scalia joined the majority opinion despite 
previously expressing disagreement with the same construction in an earlier case, Allied–
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284–97 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 114–16. Scalia also joined the majority opinion here to uphold 
Booker despite the fact that he originally dissented in that case. 
199 Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote about the importance of stare decisis in preserving stability 
and argued that it usually should apply even when a prior decision misinterprets the statute’s 
text. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 6, at 272, 331 (acknowledging that it is not appropriate 
“to overrule all cases previously ignoring or distorting the statute” because “stare decisis 
suffices to preserve them.”).  
200 See Altria, 555 U.S. at 92, 95–96, 106–07 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justices Roberts, 
Scalia, Alito joining); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402–03 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (Justice Rehnquist joining). See also infra Appendix I (listing additional cases 
critiquing the Court’s previous statutory analysis). These other textualist-leaning Justices 
were more willing to vote to overturn statutory precedents based on evolving economic 
theories than they were to overrule based on perceived errors in the original opinion’s 
statutory analysis. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting); Halliburton, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2417–27 (2014) (Thomas, Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring in the judgment); Leegin, 
551 U.S. at 887–88 (Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., majority opinion).  
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see themselves as revolutionaries seeking to reinvent the judiciary’s 
approach to interpreting statutes.201 Many served as legal advisors to 
Republican presidents prior to joining the bench: some played key roles 
in selecting and vetting judicial nominees who could be counted on to 
follow specific jurisprudential approaches, including textualism.202 As 
judges themselves, they now are on a mission to reshape the way that 
courts construe both the Constitution and statutes—championing an 
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation and a textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation. 
Given their revolutionary mission, these jurists are perfectly willing to 
overrule past precedents that, in their view, were decided using 
interpretive methods they consider illegitimate and that they took office 
intending to overthrow. In other words, rejecting old precedents does not 
bother these textualist revolutionaries because it is part and parcel of 
their agenda to depose the old jurisprudential regime. 
While some state courts appear to be comprised of a solid bloc of 
jurists who fit this “revolutionary” bill, the Justices on the U.S. Supreme 
Court fall along a spectrum in their commitment to a textualist 
revolution. At one end of the spectrum is Justice Thomas who regularly 
calls for overruling statutory (and constitutional) precedents.203 Justice 
Scalia is next, followed by Justice Alito, Justice Roberts, and then 
Justice Kennedy—as Appendix I illustrates.204 
 
201 Thanks to Bill Eskridge for this insight. 
202 See Stephen J. Markman, On Interpretation and Non-Interpretation, 3 Benchmark 219, 
219 (1987); Current Members, Supreme Court of the United States, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2017); 
Biography of Former Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, https://www.supremecourt.gov 
/about/biographyScalia.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Biography of Scalia]; 
Goldman, supra note 113 (describing Michigan Supreme Court Justice Markman’s role in 
the “Reagan Revolution”) and accompanying text; infra note 210. 
203 As Appendix I shows, Justice Thomas joined thirteen of seventeen Roberts Court 
opinions advocating overruling a statutory precedent (and authored ten of them). If we 
include Rehnquist Court opinions, he joined seventeen of twenty-four opinions calling for 
overruling a statutory precedent between 1992–2015 and authored thirteen of them. See infra 
Appendix I. 
204 Justice Scalia joined sixteen of twenty-nine opinions in cases calling for overruling a 
statutory precedent during the years he served on the Court (1986–2015) and authored five 
of them. Justice Alito joined eight of seventeen opinions calling for overruling a statutory 
precedent during his tenure (2006–2015) and authored three of them. Justice Roberts joined 
five of eighteen opinions calling for overruling a statutory precedent during his tenure 
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It should not come as a surprise that Scalia and Thomas are the 
Justices most committed to a textualist interpretive methodology. Justice 
Scalia served in the Office of Legal Counsel under President Ford205 and 
had a long history in politics and in his scholarly and judicial writings of 
seeking to revolutionize how courts interpret statutes.206 Justice 
Thomas’s calls for revolution have largely been confined to his judicial 
opinions but he has been equally, if more quietly, as committed as 
Justice Scalia to the textualist interpretive approach. Justice Alito’s 
inclusion in this group of willing “overrulers” is more unexpected and 
likely has more to do with the implementation-test exception discussed 
in Section A than with a revolutionary textualist zeal.207 Chief Justice 
Roberts, perhaps because of his role as Chief Justice, has shown himself 
to be much more concerned with institutional preservation than with 
revolution or with textualism. Indeed, as scholars have chronicled, he 
has shied away from bold moves that might appear politically or 
ideologically motivated—voting to uphold the Affordable Care Act and 
employing an incremental, almost “stealth” path to overrule Miranda, 
 
(2005–2015) and authored none of them. Justice Kennedy joined six of twenty-six opinions 
that called for overruling a statutory precedent during his tenure (1988–2015) and authored 
two of them. See id. 
205 See Biography of Scalia, supra note 202.  
206 See, e.g., Scalia & Garner, supra note 6, at xxix, 6; Scalia, supra note 19, at 3, 17; Zuni 
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 108–22 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97–100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgement).  
207 While Justice Alito is certainly a textualist, he differs from Justices Thomas and Scalia 
in that he is not committed to rejecting legislative history as an interpretive aid—on the 
contrary, he has proved willing to consult the statute’s legislative history in several cases. 
See, e.g., B & B Hardware v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015); Kellogg Brown & 
Root Servs. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1973, 1977–78 (2015); 
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2302 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting); Taniguchi v. 
Kan. Pac. Saipan, 566 U.S. 560, 569–70 n.4 (2012); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 577 & 
nn.9–10 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting); Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB, 563 U.S. 754, 761 
(2011); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565–67, 581–82 (2011) (Alito, J., 
concurring); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 515–17 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment, dissenting in part); Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 
222–23 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 470–72 (2010) 
(Alito, J., dissenting); Jones v. Harris Assocs., 559 U.S. 335, 339, 343 n.3 (2010); Corley v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 329 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting); Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. 
Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 583–85 (2008); Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 501–02 
(2006).  
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the Voting Rights Act, and other precedents.208 And Justice Kennedy, 
often referred to as the “swing” vote on the Roberts Court,209 is easily 
the least revolutionary of all the Justices in his ideological and 
methodological commitment to textualism—as well as in his career 
before joining the bench.210 
A 2015 case, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,211 nicely 
illustrates the Justices’ varying positions on the “revolutionariness” 
scale. Perez involved a D.C. Circuit decision that imposed a new 
requirement on administrative agencies: forcing them to engage in 
notice and comment before substantially changing an existing 
interpretation of their own regulations.212 All of the Justices agreed that 
the D.C. Circuit’s new rule was inconsistent with the Administrative 
 
208 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that taxpayers purchasing insurance on an Exchange established by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services are not entitled to tax credits under the Affordable Care Act because the 
federal exchange has not been set up “by the State”); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (holding that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate is 
constitutional under Congress’s taxation power); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 
381–89 (2010) (requiring a suspect who has been informed he has a right to remain silent to 
make an unambiguous statement invoking the right in order to take advantage of it); Florida 
v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59–64 (2010) (noting that while an individual has the right to consult 
with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present  during interrogation, the latter right at least need 
not be explicitly conveyed to the individual); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103–16 
(2010) (holding that releasing an individual back to the general prison population constitutes 
a break in custody that ends the presumption of involuntariness in waiving Miranda rights); 
Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 207–11 (2009) 
(permitting all political subdivisions of states to seek bailout from the preclearance 
requirements of the Voting Rights Act). See also Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth 
Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo. L.J. 1, 3 (2010) 
(describing how the Roberts Court “overrul[ed] sub silentio what [it] would not overturn 
explicitly”).  
209 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Justice’s Tolerance Toward Gays Is Seen in Sacramento 
Roots, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2015, at A10.  
210 Whereas Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, like Justice Scalia, all 
served in high-level positions during the Reagan, Bush, or Ford administrations, often 
providing legal advice about the meaning of the Constitution or federal statutes, Justice 
Kennedy spent most of his pre-judicial career in private practice and academia. See 
Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 202; Biography of Scalia, 
supra note 202. 
211 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
212 Id. at 1206. 
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Procedure Act (“APA”) and voted to reverse.213 Justices Thomas and 
Scalia would have gone further, however, to overrule a well-established 
precedent, Auer v. Robbins, which held that courts must defer to 
administrative agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations.214 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Perez argued both that Auer was 
incompatible with the APA’s text and that it created a practical 
conundrum—too much deference to agency interpretations of agency 
regulations—that prompted the D.C. Circuit’s misguided rule.215 
Justice Alito, on the other hand, was not willing to reach down and 
overrule Auer—yet—and so authored a concurring opinion that 
expressed sympathy for Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s views and 
signaled his willingness to reconsider Auer in a future case.216 Justices 
Roberts and Kennedy joined the majority opinion with no mention of 
overruling Auer. 
As Perez illustrates, Justices Thomas and Scalia see themselves as 
leaders in a quest to rid the legal system of textually incorrect, 
outmoded, and practically problematic statutory interpretations. They 
were willing, therefore, to strike down a precedent that was not even 
squarely before the Court. Justice Alito is more cautious. Though he 
seemed inclined to agree with Justices Thomas and Scalia on the merits 
of overruling Auer, he was willing to wait for a more opportune 
moment. Justices Roberts and Kennedy are far more “precedentially 
correct” in their approaches, staying silent because there was no need to 
discuss the merits of Auer in this case. 
Ultimately, the “correct answer” mindset and a commitment to 
revolutionize statutory interpretation probably apply most, or have the 
most explanatory value, for Justices Thomas’s and Scalia’s treatment of 
statutory precedents. The implementation-test exception, by contrast, 
cuts across all the textualist and textualist-leaning Justices and seems to 
be a factor in a majority of the cases in which these Justices advocate 
overruling a statutory precedent. Indeed, it is worth reiterating that over 
half the cases listed in Appendix I (seventeen of thirty-one (54.8%)) 
 
213 Id. 
214 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
215 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
216  Id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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involved implementation-test precedents.217 Of the remaining fourteen 
cases, seven contained an argument that the precedent in question 
conflicted with the statute’s plain text; all but one of these was authored 
by Justice Thomas or Justice Scalia.218 
III. IMPLICATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Having demonstrated that textualists are more willing to overrule 
statutory precedents on the grounds that implementation tests are not 
real statutory interpretation or because the “correct answer” mindset 
makes them loathe to perpetuate a mistake, it is worth examining 
whether they have a point. This Part turns from the theoretical to the 
normative, evaluating the desirability of textualist Justices’ relaxed 
approach to statutory stare decisis. It argues that if we view judicially 
created tests for implementing statutes as analogues to agency statutory 
implementation, then it makes sense to allow judicial updating of such 
tests. This is especially true where an implementation test precedent has 
proved unworkable in practice and the alternative is to wait for Congress 
to notice the problem and muster the political will to fix it. 
At the same time, however, this Article takes issue with the “correct 
answer” mindset justification, arguing that statutory precedents should 
not be overruled simply because a later Court believes an earlier Court 
“got the interpretation wrong.” It also criticizes textualist Justices’ 
readiness to abandon statutory stare decisis for closely related statutes 
that have a long history of being interpreted similarly and disapproves of 
textualists’ stingy construction of congressional overrides and continued 
reliance on “shadow precedents”—which amounts to a rigid adherence 
to statutory stare decisis in the face of legislative action disapproving the 
 
217 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.  
218 See CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 469 & n.5 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 260–61 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Preston, 
552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 401–02 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187–89 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Johnson v. Transp. 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 675–76 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra Appendix I. Overall, 
more than three-fourths (twenty-four of thirty-one (77.4%)) of the cases listed in Appendix I 
involved either an implementation test or an argument that the precedent in question 
conflicted with the statute’s plain text.  
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precedent. Section A makes the case that judicial interpretations of 
statutes that establish implementation tests have a great deal in common 
with agencies’ implementing regulations and should similarly be 
susceptible to updating and correction if they should prove problematic. 
Section B advocates that courts apply the ordinary form of stare decisis 
used for common-law precedents to implementation test precedents, but 
with a congressional-approval caveat. The section also examines how 
several of the cases described in Part I would fare under such an 
approach. 
A. The Agency Analogue 
In one sense, when courts interpret statutes—and particularly when 
they create tests for implementing a statute—they are engaging in a gap-
filling enterprise similar to that which administrative agencies perform 
when they promulgate rules, issue orders, or adopt policies designed to 
execute Congress’s statutory directives.219 As Professor Margaret Lemos 
has highlighted, many federal statutes openly delegate decision-making 
authority to federal courts through the deliberate use of vague or open-
ended statutory language.220 Among the statutes Lemos highlights as 
examples are a number that were at issue in the cases discussed in Part 
I.221 In the context of administrative agencies, it is well established that 
regulations, orders, and policies adopted pursuant to legislatively 
delegated authority are not set in stone and that agencies are free to later 
update their interpretations and implementation rules to reflect new 
factual or legal developments, practical realities, or their own evolving 
policy judgments.222 This analogue suggests that statutory stare decisis 
 
219 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: 
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 363, 370–72 (2010). 
220 Id. at 370–71. 
221 Id. (discussing the Sherman Act, Title VII, the Securities Act of 1934, the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act, the Copyright Act, and the Labor Management Relations 
Act). 
222 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009). See also Chevron 
U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (“An initial agency 
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in 
informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on 
a continuing basis.”). 
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similarly should be relaxed for judicial interpretations that amount to 
gap-filling exercises—that is, for interpretations that involve significant 
judicial policymaking rather than merely “say what the law is.” The 
classic case would include judicial interpretations that create 
implementation tests. 
There is an obvious counter to this analogue—namely, that unlike 
administrative agencies, courts are not policymaking institutions. Rather, 
courts are supposed to be neutral arbiters of the law. If we treat their 
statutory interpretations the way we treat agency interpretations— 
allowing them to change implementation tests based on societal 
developments like evolving economic theories or on their own judgment 
that a previously announced rule is producing undesirable 
consequences—courts will begin to look a lot like policymakers. That, 
in turn, could cause legitimacy problems for the Court and is the kind of 
judicial discretion-broadening practice that textualists themselves 
ordinarily object to. 
Having set forth this counter to the agency–court analogue, I want to 
resist it—at least to a certain extent. There are several reasons to 
question the courts-are-not-policymakers argument in this context. First, 
there is some merit to the textualist-leaning Justices’ argument that when 
the Court crafts an implementation test, the initial judicial interpretation 
itself amounts to an act of policymaking. That is, the Court is not merely 
deciding what “X” statutory term or phrase means; instead, it is crafting 
a rubric for applying the statute in the future—much as common-law 
courts craft standards or multi-factor inquiries for evaluating common-
law claims in future cases. Given this, it is something of a facade to 
insulate judicially created implementation tests from later revision, 
based on the argument that courts should not engage in judicial 
policymaking. Rather, as textualists and their sympathizers have 
suggested, perhaps we should be honest about calling an act of 
policymaking an act of policymaking and should permit judicial 
correction of judicially created policies if and when those policies prove 
unworkable. 
Further, legitimacy concerns should be diminished when the Court 
overturns an implementation test versus when it overturns a more 
straightforward “X term means Y” interpretation. As I have observed 
elsewhere, it should be easier, and involve less embarrassing back-
pedaling, for the Supreme Court to overturn its own rules for 
COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
216 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 104:157 
 
implementing a statute than for it to overturn its previous conclusions 
about what a statutory phrase or word means.223 That is, it should be 
more acceptable, politically and institutionally, for the Court to declare 
that, “The test we created for implementing this statute is proving 
unworkable for lower courts to apply, so it is time that we step in and fix 
it,” than it is for the Court to state, “We changed our mind. The statute 
does not really mean what we previously said it means.”224  
Second, rethinking statutory stare decisis for implementation test 
precedents does not have to be an all-or-nothing endeavor. There may be 
a middle ground between treating implementation test precedents like 
agency interpretations and entrenching them against all change. While it 
is true that courts serve a different institutional function than do 
administrative agencies, it also is true that when the Supreme Court 
updates an implementation test to address lower-court confusion or other 
test-administration problems, the Court may be viewed as engaging in a 
permissible form of policymaking—that is, supervising or acting as an 
administrator of the judicial system. Indeed, in such cases, the Supreme 
Court, like administrative agencies who have close connections and 
feedback loops with the industries they regulate,225 is more likely to be 
in touch with how lower courts are faring under an implementation test 
than are members of Congress. This is in part because the Supreme 
Court is more connected to lower courts through professional 
interactions, publications highlighting trends in judicial decisions, and 
contacts with litigants and attorneys than is Congress. It is also because, 
as the ultimate supervisor of the judicial system, the Supreme Court is in 
a better position to receive complaints about an implementation test 
from other members of the legal profession than is Congress. Although 
attorneys might lobby Congress seeking changes in the law, it is difficult 
to imagine lower court judges complaining to Congress about an 
implementation test they find difficult to administer. By contrast, lower 
court judges do write articles criticizing Supreme Court precedents and 
pen lengthy criticisms of such precedents in their own judicial 
 
223 Krishnakumar, supra note 142, at 1491–92. 
224 See generally  id. at 1492. 
225 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 
70 (2006) (detailing ways members of Congress informally supervise and provide feedback 
to agencies). 
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opinions—and litigants seeking to convince the Court to abandon an 
implementation test have significant incentives and opportunities to 
bring such criticisms to the Court’s attention. 
In addition, it seems more appropriate, institutionally, for the Court 
rather than Congress to correct an implementation test that is not 
working. Even if Congress is made aware that lower courts have 
criticized a precedent or have had trouble implementing it, Congress is 
simply less likely to reverse the precedent than is the Court. As political 
scientists and legal scholars have long recognized, the legislative process 
is filled with numerous “negative legislative checkpoints” or “veto 
gates”—e.g., committee jurisdiction, filibusters, bicameralism, 
conference committees, presentment—that prevent the majority of 
legislative proposals from becoming law.226 Moreover, the legislative 
agenda is crowded, and Congress may be more committed to addressing 
other agenda items even if it is made aware of lower court dissatisfaction 
with a Supreme Court implementation test. Indeed, depending on the 
political saliency of the implementation test precedent, Congress may 
have very little motivation to override the test—because the issue is not 
important enough to its members or to interest groups who have clout 
with its members or, conversely, because the issue is too controversial 
and its members cannot agree on how to fix the test. Relatedly, Congress 
may be less motivated to spend its limited time and resources enacting 
administrative fixes to judicial tests than it is to address other kinds of 
publicly visible issues. Indeed, it may view the supervision of 
implementation tests as a mere housekeeping matter, low on its list of 
priorities. 
B. Ordinary Stare Decisis for Implementation Tests 
Given the above, it may make sense for courts to apply a relaxed form 
of stare decisis to statutory interpretation precedents that involve an 
implementation test—and to correct such tests judicially when they turn 
out to be problematic. This Article argues that courts should apply to 
implementation test precedents the ordinary form of stare decisis that 
 
226 See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 Geo. L.J. 705, 7219–22 (1992); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice 
Case Against the Item Veto, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385, 398, 408 (1992). 
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they currently apply to common law precedents—that is, an ordinary 
presumption of correctness. 
Here is how this could work: the U.S. Supreme Court already has 
articulated a list of “prudential and pragmatic” factors that justify 
overruling a non-statutory judicial precedent. The Court articulated these 
factors in a case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,227 that involved a constitutional rather than a common-law 
precedent, but the factors nevertheless provide a useful guide for 
gauging when it is appropriate to overrule an ordinary precedent. The 
factors the Court has articulated permit judicial overruling when 
 
(1) The precedent “has proven to be intolerable simply in defying 
practical workability;” 
(2) The precedent has not created reliance interests “that would lend a 
special hardship to the consequences of overruling;” 
(3) “[R]elated principles of law have so far developed as to have left 
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”; or 
 (4) “[F]acts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to 
have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.”228 
Given the centrality of the legislature in statutory interpretation and 
the “faithful agent” nature of the relationship between the Court and 
Congress in statutory cases,229 I would add to this list of factors the 
countervailing consideration of whether Congress has expressly 
approved the implementation test at issue. That is, if Congress has 
affirmed a Court-adopted implementation test in the course of amending 
the statute—including by favorably mentioning the test in the legislative 
 
227 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
228 Id. at 854–55; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1989) 
(delineating similar criteria); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (same).  
229 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. 
Rev. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in 
statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature. . . . The judicial task is 
to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature.”); Nicholas S. 
Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model 
of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1295, 1313 (1990) (“Traditional democratic 
theory suggests that the court interpreting a statute must act as the faithful agent of the 
legislature’s intent.”). 
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record accompanying the amendment—then that legislative affirmation 
should preclude judicial overruling of the test.230 In statutory 
interpretation, unlike in common-law rulemaking and constitutional 
interpretation, Congress is sovereign and therefore should be given 
priority over courts in establishing statutory meaning. Thus, even if a 
particular implementation test has proved to be problematic, confusing, 
or unworkable in practice, it should be upheld if expressly approved by 
Congress. If Congress (the principal) says a particular interpretation of a 
statute is good, then the Court (the agent) must accept that. 
It is one thing, of course, to note all of this theoretically, but what 
would application of this ordinary form of stare decisis, supplemented 
by a congressional-approval caveat, look like in practice? The next 
section considers how this proposed rule would have played out in the 
cases discussed in Part I. 
1. Evolving Economic Theory Cases. On the one hand, none of the 
implementation tests involved in the economic-theory cases in Part I 
were unworkable or difficult to administer. Indeed, the precedent tests 
were easier to implement than the tests the textualist Justices sought to 
replace them with.231 Reliance interests, to the extent they existed, also 
favored upholding the precedent implementation tests.232 The crucial 
consideration in both Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment and Leegin 
Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. thus was the fourth Casey 
factor (facts have changed) and, to some extent, the third (related 
principles of law have changed). Indeed, in all of the evolving-
economic-theory cases listed in Appendix I, the textualist-leaning 
Justices’ push to overrule was based on an argument that the economic 
theory (i.e., the facts) underlying the interpretation at issue had changed 
so significantly as to rob the precedent of significant application or 
 
230 Recent scholarship has noted the prevalence of this type of “legislative underwrite,” 
through which Congress expressly endorses the Court’s interpretation of a statute. See Ethan 
J. Leib & James J. Brudney, Legislative Underwrites, 103 Va. L. Rev. 101 (2017). 
231 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 924 (2007) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (making this point); Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2408–09 
(2015) (citing Brief for Petitioner) (same); supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.  
232 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 925 (cataloguing “considerable reliance upon the per se rule”). 
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justification.233 In Kimble, there seemed to be little disagreement 
between the Justices on this point; all of the Justices seemed to concede 
that the rule established in Brulotte v. Thys Co234 was outmoded.235  
Under the ordinary form of stare decisis applicable to common-law 
precedents, then, the Brulotte rule might have been an acceptable 
candidate for overruling. 
In Leegin, by contrast, the question whether the economic theory had 
changed significantly was fiercely debated. While the textualist and 
textualist-leaning Justices argued that new studies by economists had 
disproved the theories on which the precedent interpretations were 
based, the purposivist-leaning Justices insisted that the discrediting 
economic studies were not new, but merely repeated critiques that had 
been raised and rejected when the precedents were decided.236 The 
Justices who voted to overrule in Leegin also argued that subsequent 
legal developments—including rulings by the Supreme Court in related 
cases—had eroded the rule adopted in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons Co.237 (Casey’s third factor).238  The purposivist Justices 
who voted to affirm Dr. Miles disagreed with this characterization.239 
They also hinted at congressional approval, noting that Congress had 
considered and rejected the economic arguments raised by the overrulers 
in legislative hearings.240 (The purposivist Justices did not, however, 
point to any evidence of express congressional approval of the Dr. Miles 
precedent). Given this contention over the extent to which the relevant 
 
233 See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415–16 (Alito, J., dissenting); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2420–21 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889–92; State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15–19 (1997). 
234 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
235 See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412 (noting a “broad scholarly consensus” supports 
Kimble’s position). 
236 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 920–23 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). A similar debate 
between the textualist and purposivist Justices took place in another economic theory case. 
See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2410.  
237 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  
238 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887. Cf. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2418, 2423 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (similarly arguing that subsequent legal developments lend 
support of overruling precedent). 
239 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 920–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
240 See id. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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factual and legal circumstances changed, Leegin likely would have been 
a close case even under a relaxed form of stare decisis. 
2. Statutes In Pari Materia. A rule applying ordinary stare decisis for 
implementation test precedents would not, as a general matter, support 
textualist Justices’ relaxed approach to precedents for related statutes 
that are in pari materia with the statute at issue in the precedent case. 
That is, the traditional rule would not allow members of a later Court to 
refuse to apply an implementation-test precedent to a closely related 
statute simply because the members of the later Court believe the initial 
construction of the first statute to be incorrect. In my view, this rule 
makes sense because when two statutes have a history of being 
interpreted in the same manner—such that constructions given to one 
also govern the other—allowing the Court to reject an implementation 
test applicable to one statute when construing the other results in 
overwhelming confusion about which related precedents apply to both 
statutes and which do not. In the Title VII and ADEA context, for 
example, the law now stands in a perplexing in-between position: Title 
VII precedents sometimes apply to ADEA interpretation questions, but 
other times do not.241 Moreover, this kind of related-statutes exception is 
really just a way of allowing a later Court to erode a statutory precedent 
with which it disagrees—by limiting its application. In this sense, the 
related-statute exception is merely another version of the “just plain 
wrong!” argument. 
On the other hand, if an implementation test precedent that ordinarily 
would apply to a related statute has proved unworkable, then the Court 
would not be bound to apply that precedent to the related statute. Thus, 
in CBOCS West Inc. v. Humphries, the dissenting opinion’s argument 
that the retaliation claim recognized for Section 1982 should not be 
applied to Section 1981 would not have succeeded, because there was no 
indication that the rules established in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park or 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. were unworkable to administer or 
 
241 This confusion is not entirely the fault of Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 
(2009). Earlier cases had muddled the waters before Gross—holding, for example, that 
procedural questions about the ADEA should be governed by Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) precedents rather than Title VII precedents because the ADEA’s remedial 
provisions were modeled on the FLSA. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–85 (1978). 
But Gross has added significantly to the confusion and lack of predictability.  
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that subsequent legal or factual developments had rendered those 
precedents obsolete. Gross v. FBL Financial Services would be a closer 
case under the proposed ordinary stare decisis rule because the majority 
opinion did argue that the “motivating factor” test had proved 
unworkable in the lower courts.242 However, this argument was 
countered by the fact that Congress expressly endorsed the “motivating 
factor” framework in its 1991 amendments to Title VII.243 Under the 
congressional-approval caveat advocated in this Article, that express 
legislative endorsement would trump any workability objections to the 
Court’s implementation test. 
3. Unworkable Implementation Tests. As suggested by Casey factor 
four, implementation tests that the Court believes to be unworkable 
should be ideal candidates for overruling. In order to guard against abuse 
of this factor, courts should ensure that there is sufficient evidence of 
lower court confusion or other difficulty administering an 
implementation test before overruling it. Of the cases discussed in Part 
I.C, Altria Group v. Good seems to be the strongest candidate for 
overruling. This is because there does seem to have been objective 
evidence of lower-court confusion and difficulty implementing the 
predicate-duty test established in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, and there 
does not appear to have been any evidence that Congress endorsed that 
test.244 By contrast, as discussed above, ordinary stare decisis likely 
would not have supported the Court’s refusal in Gross to apply Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins’s burden-shifting implementation test to the 
ADEA—since Congress had expressly approved that test in the 1991 
CRA.245 Last, it also seems unlikely that Holder v. Hall would have 
presented a good opportunity for overruling, even under ordinary stare 
decisis. There does not seem to have been any objective evidence that 
the vote-dilution test adopted in Thornburg v. Gingles and criticized by 
Justice Thomas in Holder had proved unworkable in practice. Rather, 
 
242 Gross, 557 U.S. at 178-79. 
243 See id. at 185–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because Congress has codified a mixed-
motives framework for Title VII cases—the vast majority of antidiscrimination lawsuits—
the Court’s concerns about that framework are of no moment.”). 
244 See Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 97 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 
confusion in lower federal court cases). 
245 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 185–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Thomas’s objection to the Gingles test seems to have been based 
on a view that it invited too much judicial policymaking—an objection 
based on his jurisprudential philosophy, rather than concrete evidence 
regarding lower courts’ experiences implementing the test.246 
4. Inaccurate Precedents. Notably, an administrability-based 
exception to statutory stare decisis would not allow for overruling based 
on the Court’s conviction that a previous interpretation was “just plain 
wrong!” This is because a “just plain wrong!” standard is open-ended 
and allows judges to overturn precedents based on simple disagreement 
with the original interpretation—something that is frowned upon even 
under ordinary stare decisis. Indeed, a “just plain wrong!” standard 
would effectively leave every precedent open to revision and, in the 
process, upend the very concept of statutory stare decisis. As scholars 
have noted: 
[I]f a court under a purported regime of stare decisis is 
free to disregard any previous decisions it believes 
wrong, then the standard for disregarding is the same 
when stare decisis applies as when it does not, and the 
alleged stare decisis norm turns out to be doing no 
work.247 
In other words, stare decisis comes into effect only when the Court 
believes a previous case was incorrectly decided—if the precedent were 
correct on the merits, the Court would uphold it for that reason, without 
regard to stare decisis.248 
5. Overrides. Finally, a rule applying the ordinary form of stare 
decisis to statutory precedents that create implementation tests would 
not support textualist Justices’ narrow approach to congressional 
overrides in certain recent cases. When Congress does pay attention to 
 
246 Holder, 512 U.S. at 892–93 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
247 Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 Ga. 
St. U.L. Rev. 381, 389–90 (2007). 
248 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on 
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 570 (2001); Jill E. Fisch, The 
Implications of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 93, 97 
(2003) (noting that stare decisis does no work where the later court agrees on the merits); 
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411, 417 (2010) 
(“…[T]he Court needs to talk about stare decisis only where it suspects or concludes that a 
precedent is wrong.”).   
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an implementation test and goes to the trouble of overriding the Court’s 
formulation, the Court should yield and give full effect to the override. 
This is a corollary to the congressional-approval caveat described above; 
Congress is the master in matters of statutory interpretation, so when it 
expressly addresses the validity of a statutory precedent, its will should 
be given effect. Moreover, the agency analogue discussed earlier 
suggests that when Congress expressly disapproves of the Court’s 
adoption of a particular implementation test, the Court, like 
administrative agencies, should follow Congress’s expressed preference 
rather than seek to curtail it. Of course, the Court is not an 
administrative agency; it has a distinct and unique role to play in 
monitoring lower courts and the judicial system as well as a checks-and-
balances function that agencies do not possess. But these roles and 
functions do not justify holding Congress to what is effectively a clear-
statement standard, the way the Court has done in the cases discussed in 
Section II.B.  
Further, while it makes sense for the Court, given its monitor role, to 
update an implementation test when it becomes aware of workability 
problems that Congress is not aware of, it does not make sense for the 
Court to stubbornly adhere to its own initial interpretation when 
Congress has paid attention to an implementation test and has repudiated 
it. In other words, the Court’s views about the merits of its own test may 
trump when Congress has not spoken, but they should not trump when 
Congress has spoken. Notably, in override cases like Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber, the Court seems deliberately to be limiting the 
reach of a congressional override—which seems problematic both from 
a faithful-agency and from a separation-of-powers perspective. After all, 
how is Congress supposed to provide a legislative check if the Court 
reads Congress’s corrections narrowly, privileging the prior judicial 
interpretation whenever possible? 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to illuminate an important and little-noticed 
trend in statutory interpretation jurisprudence—textualist Justices’ 
willingness to abandon statutory stare decisis in certain cases—and to 
glean important insights and lessons about textualism and statutory 
interpretation theory from that trend. In particular, it has demonstrated 
that textualists and their cohorts seem to view statutory precedents that 
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create an implementation test as different, and less worthy of deference 
by subsequent courts, than precedents that engage in ordinary “X term 
means Y” analysis. Further, it has argued that textualists’ attitude 
towards implementation tests highlights under-appreciated differences 
between textualists and purposivists, such as the greater weight that 
textualists give to the Supreme Court’s monitoring function over lower 
courts.  This Article also has suggested that the implementation-test 
caveat may help explain textualist Justices’ reluctance to give full effect 
to some congressional overrides. Normatively, it has agreed with the 
textualist Justices that statutory stare decisis should be relaxed for 
precedents that establish implementation tests, with the caveat that the 
Court should not overrule an implementation test if Congress has 
expressly approved that test through statements in the legislative record, 
in an amendment, or subsequent law. At the same time, it has criticized 
some textualist Justices’ willingness to overrule statutory precedents 
with which they simply disagree—and has defended statutory stare 
decisis in such cases. 
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Kimble v. Marvel 
Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 
2401 (2015) (Patent 
Act) 







Perez v. Mortgage 
Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. 
Ct. 1199 (2015) 
(Administrative 
Procedure Act) 
Concurrence Alito Willingness to consider 
overruling in future 
case 
 Concurrence Scalia Text 
 Concurrence Thomas Text 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Cmty. Affairs v. 
Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc.,  
135 S. Ct. 2507 
(2015) (Fair Housing 
Act) 
Dissent Thomas Text, Related Statute 
(involves 
implementation test) 
 Dissent Alito (Roberts, 
Scalia, 
Thomas) 
Text, Related Statute 
(involves 
implementation test) 
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Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc.,  










Mich. v. Bay Mills 
Indian Cmty., 134 S. 
Ct. 2024 (2014) 










Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs.,   
557 U.S. 167 (2009) 
(Age Discrimination 










Altria Grp. v. Good,  











CBOCS West, Inc. v. 
Humphries,  
553 U.S. 442 (2008) 
(Section 1981)  
Dissent Thomas 
(Scalia) 
Text, Related Statute 
Gonzalez v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 242 
(2008) (Federal 
Magistrate Act) 
Dissent Thomas Text, Unworkable, 
Inconsistent w/ 
Previous Cases 
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John R. Sand & 
Gravel v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 130 
(2008) (Tucker Act) 





Preston v. Ferrer,  
552 U.S. 346 (2008) 
(Federal Arbitration 
Act) 
Dissent Thomas Text 
Kimbrough v. United 
States, 
552 U.S. 85 (2007) 
(Sentencing Statute) 





Leather Prods. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 















Clark v. Martinez,  




Text, Issue Almost 
Constitutional 
BedRoc Ltd. v. 
United States, 541 





Text, Related Statute 
Hohn v. United Majority Stevens Text, Subsequent 
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Hilton v. S.C. Pub. 
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Corp. v. Mayacamas,  









Johnson v. Transp. 
Agency Santa Clara 
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implementation test) 
Square D Co. v. 
Niagara Frontier 
Tariff Bureau, Inc., 
476 U.S 409 (1986) 
(Sherman Act) 
Dissent Marshall Subsequent Legal 
Developments 
City of Oklahoma 
City v. Tuttle,  
471 U.S. 808 (1985) 
(Section 1983) 
Dissent Stevens Judicial 






Miller v. Fenton,  
474 U.S. 104 (1985) 
(Habeas Corpus 
Statute) 




Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs. Of New 
York, 436 U.S. 658 








Departed from Other 
Caselaw 
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 










Lodge 76, Int’l Assoc. 
of Machinists and 
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Relations Comm’n,  









Flood v. Kuhn, 407 







  Dissent Marshall 
(Brennan) 
 
Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, Inc.,  
398 U.S. 375 (1970) 
(Death on the High 
Seas Act, Jones Act) 
Majority Harlan (Unan.) Unworkable  
(involves 
implementation test) 
